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Students must have the opportunity to connect, associate, and 
communicate freely and without interference on the Internet except in cases 
of clear threat of harm or imminent danger.1 Supreme Court precedent does 
not suggest that First Amendment protections should apply with less force 
when public students utilize technology in their private time.2 The protection 
                                                 
 1  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (stating that the First Amendment 
permits a State to ban “true threats,” which are statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an unlawful and violent act, regardless 
of actual intent to carry out the threat, to protect individuals from the fear of violence and 
disruption); LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 89 (2012) (arguing employees and students deserve 
free speech rights and there is a necessity to create a Constitution for the web protecting 
internet expression). 
 2  See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). A state-supported college 
denied Petitioner’s application requesting official campus recognition of a local Students for 
Democratic Society chapter. Id. at 179. The Supreme Court further noted, “[t]he college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break 
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of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.3 Courts have struggled to draw a line that protects both 
the pedagogical concerns of educational curriculums and the often 
controversial, yet essential, student voice under the First Amendment since 
the early 1900s.4  
In the meantime, social networking platforms have revolutionized 
the way people communicate.5 There are currently more than one billion 
www.Facebook.com (“Facebook”) users worldwide.6 More than sixty-five 
percent of American adults and nearly ninety-five percent of younger age 
groups use social networking websites. 7  Society encourages children to 
acquire computer skills at a young age, understanding the importance of 
these skills in what has become a technological world.8 Users make their 
thoughts instantly accessible to millions by posting comments, videos, or 
pictures from nearly any location, presenting new and important First 
Amendment issues for courts across the country.9 Without guidance from the 
United States Supreme Court, lower courts have struggled to determine if 
                                                                                                                   
no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic 
freedom.” Id. at 180–81. See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967).  
 3  Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (stating “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools . . . ‘[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate . . . .’”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957).  
 4  Healy, 408 U.S. at 197 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[Student] interests and 
concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty. They often have values, views, 
and ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or 
indoctrinated. When they ask for change, they, the students, speak in the tradition of Jefferson 
and Madison and the First Amendment”).  
 5  John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of Student-
Athletes: A Recipe for Disaster, 75 TEX. B. J. 840, 842 (2012) (discussing the discipline of 
student athletes for information shared on social networking websites).  
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. On February 4, 2004, “The Facebook” launched and became available to 
students at Harvard University. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 30 (2010). By the following fall 
semester, eighty-five percent of American college students were users of the site, which had 
dropped the “The” to become known as simply “Facebook.” Id. at 149. Facebook later became 
available to non-college students and its growth continued world-wide. Id. at 150.  
 8  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that we do not let children drive until 
they are sixteen or drink until they are twenty-one and allowing a child to access a social 
networking website can be the equivalent of handing them the car keys in terms of the damage 
they can do to both themselves, as well as others).  
 9  Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use of 
Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices for Athletic Departments, 
38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 452–53 (2012) (addressing the legality of limiting or restricting the use of 
social media by college athletes).  
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and when educational institutions can punish students for speech that occurs 
online.10 
The First Amendment signifies a profound commitment to the 
fundamental principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited.11 
This principle exists because “speech concerning public affairs is more than 
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”12 As society advances, 
issues continue to arise which present questions unforeseen by the Framers 
of the Constitution.13 In such cases, the Constitution is treated as a living 
document, adaptable to new situations, and time-honored principles must be 
applied consistently.14 Accordingly, constitutional protections must not yield 
to the developing technological world.15 
In 2009, the University of Minnesota punished Amanda Tatro, a 
junior in the Mortuary Science Program, for a number of disturbing status 
updates to her Facebook profile.16 Tatro appealed the University-imposed 
sanctions.17 The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately held that a university 
may discipline students for statements made on a social networking website 
without infringing upon the First Amendment if the speech violates 
“narrowly tailored” academic rules which are “directly related” to 
professional standards of conduct.18 The Tatro decision exposes Minnesota 
students to a wide range of ramifications for otherwise protected, off-
campus, First Amendment speech.19  The precedent set by the Minnesota 
                                                 
 10  Mickey Lee Jett, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the 
Age of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 896–97 (2012) (suggesting the 
inconsistency in lower court opinions is rooted in the difficulty of applying traditional school-
speech precedent to “cyberspeech”). 
 11  N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the 
constitutional commitment to wide-open freedom of expression “may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” but 
remains protected). 
 12  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (stating further that since 
erroneous and often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate, they must be protected 
if freedoms of expression are to endure); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 
(1971) (stating that the word “fuck” should be protected even though it is often less palatable 
than other swear words, because words are often chosen as much for their otherwise 
inexpressible emotive as their cognitive force).  
 13  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682–83 (1952) 
(affirming that the Constitution was intended to endure the unforeseen transformations of 
American society).  
 14  Id.  
 15  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 89 (arguing that internet speech should be as 
protected with as much force, if not more, than traditional speech under the First 
Amendment).  
 16  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (discussing 
Tatro’s involvement in the Mortuary Science Department at the University of Minnesota, as 
well as its requirements). 
 17  Id. at 509. 
 18  Id. at 511. 
 19  See id. at 524. The Minnesota Supreme Court states in their decision that Tatro 
“is based on the specific circumstances of [the] case—a professional program that operates 
4
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Supreme Court in Tatro contravenes the long-standing principle that student 
expression cannot constitutionally be confined to approved sentiments. 20 
Students must be able to express themselves freely on their social networking 
websites under the First Amendment, just as they would in any other off-
campus forum, absent cases of clear threat of harm or danger.21 
Part II of this article examines Tatro’s battle to have the University 
sanctions reversed, beginning with the University’s formal appeals process 
through the Minnesota Supreme Court’s final opinion.22 Part III discusses 
modern social media, the regulation and punishment for otherwise protected 
First Amendment speech, and how public universities have used the Internet 
to monitor post-secondary students and applicants.23 
Part IV argues that off-campus conduct is not interrelated to on-
campus conduct, and therefore should not be punished as such.24 Further, 
Part IV contends that broad professional standards and often vague 
university rules should not be enforced by university regulation of students’ 
social networking activity that occurs off campus.25 Part IV also asserts that, 
without clear direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, students and public 
schools are left to wrestle with the difficult, uncertain, and inconsistent 
lower-court decisions that are arising in cases like Tatro’s throughout the 
country.26 Finally, Part IV argues that absent a clear threat of imminent harm, 
the First Amendment should protect a student’s Internet speech from 
university regulation.27  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
under established professional conduct standards . . . and measured discipline that was not 
arbitrary or a pretext for punishing the student’s protected views.” Id. 
 20  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
(holding that student speech may not be regulated absent facts showing a material and 
substantial interference with the discipline and operation of a school). 
 21  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 89 (suggesting that the First Amendment’s 
protections should apply with as much, if not more, force in instances of social media for 
students and employees).  
 22  See infra Part II (showing the procedural history of Tatro beginning with the 
University of Minnesota’s own appeal process through treatment by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court).  
 23  See infra Part III (discussing the pertinent history of First Amendment student 
speech in public grade schools, how courts have applied the resulting case law to the post-
secondary setting, and the wide scope of professional standards sought to be taught by post-
secondary universities). 
 24  See infra Part IV.A (asserting that the justifications for limiting First 
Amendment protections when speech occurs on campus are not similar enough to off-campus 
speech to warrant similar regulation by public schools).  
 25  See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the potential audience for off-campus speech 
is too vast to warrant the same protection and regulation of on-campus speech). 
 26  See infra Part IV.C (suggesting that public schools are left at a loss, just as their 
students are, for applying the shaky rules that result from misdirected opinions such as Tatro). 
 27  See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the First Amendment should extend to protect 
students from regulation of their internet speech). 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Amanda Tatro, like many of her classmates, used Facebook to keep 
in touch with friends and family while she attended school. 28   The 
administration informed Tatro during orientation for her anatomy laboratory 
course that discreet conversation regarding the class would be allowed, but 
blogging would not.29 Much controversy existed regarding whether Tatro’s 
instructor ever explained what she intended the term “blogging” to include; 
however, it was commonplace for students to post about the program on their 
own Facebook pages.30 What makes Tatro’s experience different than that of 
her classmates is the reaction that followed when a student brought the posts 
to the attention of the department.31 
 
A. The Posts 
In the fall of 2009, Tatro was enrolled in the Bachelor of Science 
Mortuary Science Program at the University of Minnesota’s Medical School 
offered to upper-class and undergraduate students.32 The program requires 
students to successfully complete classes such as science, business, grief 
psychology, death and dying across cultures, embalming, and a clinical 
rotation in a funeral home.33 The program does not, however, offer or require 
a specific ethics course.34 The primary purpose of the program is to prepare 
mortuary students to be morticians and funeral directors.35 
                                                 
 28  See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing Tatro’s use of Facebook 
as her “whole social outlet” while studying at the University of Minnesota).  
 29  See infra note 41 and accompanying text (stating that Tatro’s instructor felt 
defining the term “blogging” was unnecessary because anybody could look it up in the 
dictionary).  
 30  See infra note 41 and accompanying text (stating the professor testified that she 
did not provide the definition of “blogging” in any of her course materials). 
 31  See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing that it was common for 
other students to make comments regarding lab and course work on Facebook).  
 32  Respondent’s Brief, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131429 at *3 (discussing the requirements of the 
University of Minnesota’s Mortuary Science Program).  
 33  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428 at *2 (explaining the required 
courses for completion of the Mortuary Science Program at the University of Minnesota).  
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at *1. Tatro developed an interest in mortuary science after caring for her 
mother, who had suffered a severe brain injury, and serving as her mother’s legal guardian. Id. 
at *2. Prior to her mother’s injury, Tatro also struggled with her own physical limitations due 
to a handicap of her central nervous system. Id. Tatro’s disability caused her to be completely 
immobile for many years until medical advances allowed electric spinal cord stimulators to be 
implanted and enabled her to move. Id. Tatro felt these experiences familiarized her with 
dying and grieving. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *2. At the same time, 
she believed that she needed to joke and express humor, or “[she would] be the most 
miserable person on the planet.” Id. 
6
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The Mortuary Department required laboratory courses using human 
cadavers from the University’s Anatomy Bequest Program, which relied on 
individuals to donate their bodies to the University after death. 36  Tatro 
enrolled in three of the required laboratory courses in the fall of 2009 and 
received orientation and instructions on the Anatomy Bequest Program 
policies and the syllabus rules which governed each laboratory course.37 
Tatro signed the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access 
Orientation Disclosure Form, acknowledging that she understood and agreed 
to comply with both the program rules, as well as the additional laboratory 
polices stated in course syllabi. 38  Course rules allowed respectful and 
discreet “[c]onversational language of cadaver dissection outside the 
laboratory,” but prohibited “blogging” about the cadaver dissection or 
anatomy lab. 39  Tatro’s lab instructor, who drafted the course syllabus, 
testified that she intended “blogging” to be a broad term inclusive of 
discussion on Facebook and Twitter. 40  However, the University did not 
define “blogging” in any of the course criterion or its campus-wide rules and 
policies.41 The lab instructor told students that failure to adhere to these rules 
may result in their removal from the laboratory and anatomy course.42 
                                                 
 36  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012). The University’s 
medical, dental, physical therapy, occupational therapy, medical device engineering, and 
mortuary departments all rely on donations through the bequest program for teaching and 
research purposes. Id. More information regarding the University’s professional schools may 
be found at: https://webapps prd.oit.umn.edu/pcas/viewCatalogProgram.do? 
programID=194&strm=1129&campus=UMNTC. Each of these respected programs also seeks 
to teach respective professional standards. Id. 
 37  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *4. The first three hour session of Tatro’s 
laboratory course was devoted almost entirely to orientation materials including a fourteen 
minute Anatomy Bequest Program video which gave examples of disrespectful conversation 
outside of the lab such as one where two students were overheard discussing dissection in lab 
on a bus by a potential donor. Id.at *4–5. 
 38  Id. at *7–8. The course syllabus for Tatro’s anatomy lab class included rules 
intended to promote respect for the cadaver. Id. at *5. 
 39 Id.  
 40  Id. at *6. Tatro later appealed the University sanctions to the University of 
Minnesota’s Office for Student Conduct and Academic Integrity (OSCAI) board, which 
administers student discipline. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *12–13. The instructor 
testified during the OSCAI hearing that she told students blogging included Facebook, 
Twitter, and MySpace; however, in response to the question, “So you specifically tell them 
that essentially any Internet sites like Facebook is not acceptable to write about the dissection 
or the cadaver?” There is no recorded response. Realtor’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, 
at *10. Tatro testified that there was no discussion of what constituted blogging at orientation 
and that it was common for students to make general comments about lab classes on 
Facebook. Id. Jesse Clarkson, a mortuary student who testified on behalf of the University, did 
not recall if the instructor had mentioned anything about Facebook, Twitter, or MySpace in 
reference to blogging when he attended orientation. Id. 
 41  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *10. Tatro’s instructor 
testified that it was not necessary to define blogging because it was a term that anyone could 
look up in the dictionary. Id. The instructor claimed at the hearing that she relied on the 
7
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Tatro, like many students, used Facebook as a means to keep in 
contact with her family and friends while attending school.43 On December 
11, 2009, one of Tatro’s classmates notified Mortuary Science Program staff 
of a handful of Tatro’s Facebook posts which the student felt were offensive 
in relation to a laboratory cadaver.44 The University ultimately claimed that 
the following four posts violated University program and rules: 
 
Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, 
Bernie today. Let’s see if I can have a lab void of 
reprimanding and having my scalpel taken away. 
Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . (November 
12[, 2009])45 
Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to 
Monday’s embalming therapy as well as a rumored 
opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of 
aggression to be taken out with a trocar. (December 
6[, 2009])46 
                                                                                                                   
definition of a blog from Webster dictionary; however, she did not share this definition in any 
of her course materials. Id.  
 42  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *8. There was no mention of any other 
disciplinary consequences in the course materials. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 
33, at *13. 
 43  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *2 (citation omitted). In fact, 
Tatro described Facebook as her “whole social outlet.” Id. Tatro’s Facebook friends included 
hundreds of personal friends outside of the Mortuary Science Program, family, and 
classmates. Id. During the fall of 2009, Tatro’s Facebook privacy settings allowed friends, as 
well as friends of friends to view her Facebook page. Id. Tatro later restricted her privacy 
settings so that only friends could view her account. Id. Tatro later claimed she did not believe 
that her Facebook posts fell within the scope of the blogging prohibition. Tatro v. Univ. of 
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2012). 
 44  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *8–9 (emphasis added). Tatro stressed 
she made the posts off campus. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524 n.5. 
 45  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *3. Tatro later explained that 
her reference to the donor as “Bernie” came from one of her favorite movies Weekend at 
Bernie’s. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). The instructor had allowed past students to name donors 
as long as the names were respectful. Id. (citation omitted). Although Tatro did not mention 
her reasoning behind the name in any of her Facebook posts, the instructor later testified that 
she believed the name was in poor taste do to the plot in the movie where characters bring a 
deceased individual with them as if he was still alive. Id. (citation omitted). The director of the 
program, Michael LuBrant, testified that there was fear about Tatro hiding a scalpel up her 
sleeve. Id. at *6 (citation omitted). LuBrant claimed this post violated the Mortuary 
Department’s policy to treat deceased persons with “proper care and dignity.” Id. (citation 
omitted).  
 46  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *3 (emphasis added). A trocar 
is an instrument for embalming used to aspirate fluids and gases. Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 
The use of a trocar requires force to penetrate the body’s tissue. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
Tatro later explained that her comment about aggression was made in reference to a prior 
8
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[Amanda Beth Tatro] Who knew embalming lab 
was so cathartic! I still want to stab a certain 
someone in the neck with a trocar though. Hmm . . . 
perhaps I will spend the evening updating my 
‘Death List #5’ and making friends with the 
crematory guy. I do know the code . . . (December 
7[, 2009])47 
Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness 
that my best friend, Bernie, will no longer be with 
me as of Friday next week. I wish to accompany him 
to the retort. Now where will I go or who will I hang 
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye 
Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket. (Undated)48 
 According to the director of the Mortuary Science Department 
Program, Michael LuBrant, staff members grew concerned for their safety.49 
Based on these concerns, LuBrant notified University police about the 
posts. 50  LuBrant told Tatro to stay away from the Mortuary Science 
Department and its staff while the matter was under investigation. 51 
According to the police report, LuBrant told police Tatro was suspended, 
                                                                                                                   
incident where a classmate had to use both hands to insert the trocar. Id. (citation omitted). At 
that time, other students joked about aggression. Id.  
 47  Id. at *3. LuBrant testified he believed Tatro’s Facebook entries about stabbing 
a certain someone as threats to harm another person. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra 
note 33, at *7 (citation omitted). Tatro did not mention or indicate on Facebook any specific 
person she wanted to stab; however, later testified that she was referring to an ex-boyfriend. 
Id. at *6 (citation omitted). Tatro was also upset because she had just given permission for her 
mother to undergo an operation. Id. (citation omitted). She assumed that her Facebook friends 
would know she was not serious, but speaking sarcastically. Id. (citation omitted).    
 48  Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Within a week of the Facebook post, Tatro had 
written “I heart Bernie” on the blackboard in class. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). The instructor 
did not tell Tatro at that time that she felt referencing him as Bernie was inappropriate. 
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *8. Tatro later testified that “Lock of hair in 
my pocket” referenced on of her favorite Black Crow songs. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). Tatro 
further explained during the OSCAI hearing that she believed she could be humorous on 
Facebook regarding her classes, but knew there were limitations as to the information she 
could share with non-classmates which “is precisely why I didn’t go into graphic detail on 
what I do in embalming labs or in the anatomy lab.” Id. (citation omitted).  
 49  Id. at *5. LuBrant testified he was “very much concerned” when he saw the 
posts because he “didn't know what they meant or what they were referring to, who they were 
talking about.” Id. LuBrant claimed that he later heard the post regarding stabbing someone in 
the neck may have been referring to him. Id. LuBrant met with Tatro on December 14, 2009, 
but never asked Tatro who or what she was referring to in her posts. Relator’s Brief and 
Addendum, supra note 33, at *5. 
 50 Id. at *12. 
 51  Id.  
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however, later claimed the police report was inaccurate and that no one had 
ever told Tatro she was suspended from the program.52 
 Tatro contacted the media in an attempt to bring attention to what 
she believed was a suppression of her First Amendment right to free 
speech.53 The Anatomy Bequest Program began to receive letters and phone 
calls following the media coverage from donor families who expressed 
concern about Tatro’s behavior.54 University police ultimately determined 
that Tatro had not acted criminally, and on December 16, 2009, two days 
after she had been told to stay away from the department, staff allowed Tatro 
to return to complete her coursework and final examinations. 55  Tatro’s 
laboratory instructor notified Tatro via email on December 22, 2009,  
that her grade had been entered for “MORT 3171” as a “C+”, but that the 
instructor was submitting a formal complaint to the Office of Student 
Conduct and Academic Integrity (“OSCAI”) and recommending a grade 
change to an “F” as a sanction for the Facebook posts.56  
B. Challenging the OSCAI before the University of Minnesota’s Campus 
Committee on Student Behavior 
Tatro challenged the OSCAI complaint in a formal hearing before 
the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (“CCSB”).57 Tatro testified at 
the hearing, explaining that she only intended her friends and family who 
would understand her sarcasm and morbid humor, as well as her references 
to her favorite movies and songs, to read her Facebook posts.58 She further 
explained that her post regarding stabbing a “certain someone” was meant to 
be seen by her ex-boyfriend, who had broken up with her the night before.59 
                                                 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 40 n.5.  
 54 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *12. 
 55  Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *12. 
 56  Id. at *12–13. LuBrant asserted that Tatro did not believe she had done 
anything wrong and because she had not expressed remorse for her actions, he and the core 
faculty of the Mortuary Science Department felt she should be expelled. Id. at *13 (citation 
omitted). None of the faculty members who recommended expulsion asked Tatro what she 
intended by any of her Facebook posts. Id. (citation omitted). 
 57  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2012). 
 58  Id. at 513. Tatro testified that she gave her cadaver the name “Bernie” 
referencing the movie “Weekend at Bernie’s”; that “Death List #5” was a reference to another 
one of her favorite movies, “Kill Bill”; and, that the phrase “Lock of hair in my pocket” was a 
reference to a song by the Black Crowes, one of her favorite bands. Id. Further, her post from 
December 7, 2009, “I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though” 
was a reaction to her long distance boyfriend who had recently ended their relationship; 
something her friends and family knew she had been upset by. Id. at 514. There is no 
evidence, aside from her Facebook posts, that Tatro discussed her anatomy laboratory or 
personally identifiable facts regarding the human donor with non-classmates. See id. at 521–
22. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that Tatro physically handled the cadaver in a 
disrespectful way as her “lock of hair in my pocket” reference may suggest. See id.  
 59  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514. According to a study done in February of 2012 by 
the Pew Center’s Internet and American Life Project, the average Facebook user has 245 
10
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LuBrant, two of the programs’ instructors, and the President of the Mortuary 
Science Student Association also testified at the hearing about the program’s 
focus on teaching respect, dignity, and professionalism.60 The CCSB found 
Tatro responsible for violating the Student Conduct Code, which prohibits 
threatening conduct, and violating University rules, which prohibit conduct 
that violates departmental regulations.61  The CCSB’s decision stated that 
Tatro’s behavior was inappropriate for an individual within the mortuary 
profession.62  The CCSB required Tatro to seek professional guidance to 
facilitate her personal and professional development, and imposed the 
following sanctions: 
1. Changing Tatro’s grade in MORT 3171 to an 
“F”; 
 
2. Completion of a “directed study course” in 
clinical ethics; 
 
3. A letter to one of the faculty members in the 
Mortuary Science Program addressing the issue 
of respect within the program and the 
profession;  
 
4. A psychiatric evaluation at the student health 
service clinic and completion of any 
recommendations made by their evaluation; and 
 
5. Placement on probation for the remainder of 
Tatro’s undergraduate career.63 
 
                                                                                                                   
“friends.” Hayley Tsukayama, Your Facebook Friends Have More Friends Than You, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 3, 2012. These friends as well as often “friends of friends” may access any post 
made by the user. Id. Users can reach an average of 150,000 other people through friends of 
friends. Id.  Less than five percent of users hide content from other users on their Facebook 
feeds. Id. Further explanation, as well as a link to the Pew Center’s statistical findings, can be 
found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/your-facebook-friends-have-
more-friends-than-you/2012/02/03/gIQAuNUlmQ_story.html.  
 60  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514. 
 61  Id. Such violations included: “(1) Anatomy Laboratory Rule #7, which 
provides in part that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not 
allowable’; and (2) the rules listed on the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access 
Orientation Disclosure Form.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 62  Id. (indicating that “the reason that these rules are strict is to set standards for 
behavior from the beginning of the program that will carry into the profession”).  
 63  Id. at 514–15. 
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Tatro subsequently appealed the CCSB’s decision to the Provost’s 
Appeal Committee, comprised of a panel that makes nonbinding 
recommendations for the Provost’s review and ultimate decision.64 Provost 
E. Thomas Sullivan issued a final decision, which affirmed the findings and 
imposed CCSB sanctions.65 
 
C. Appealing to the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
 Tatro appealed the University’s decision to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals by writ of certiorari.66 Tatro alleged, among other things, that the 
sanctions violated her constitutional right to free speech.67  The court of 
appeals determined the University’s sanctions were constitutional if staff 
reasonably concluded that Tatro’s posts would “materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school under the Tinker standard.”68 
The court found that Tatro’s Facebook activity had, in fact, substantially 
disrupted the work and discipline of the University, as well as the faith and 
confidence potential donors had in the bequest program. 69  Beyond the 
University’s concern for the safety and security of its campus, the appeals 
court believed that Tatro’s Facebook posts had resulted in substantial issues 
regarding the integrity of the University’s Anatomy Bequest Program when 
concerned families and funeral directors contacted the University to 
complain following the resulting media coverage.70 The court found these 
                                                 
 64  Id. at 515. 
 65  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 515. 
 66  See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); 17 
STEPHEN F. BEFORT, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:52, at n.21 
(3d ed. 2012) (explaining that judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions may be invoked only 
by writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals absent a statute or appellate rule 
authorizing review to the district court). 
 67  Realtor’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *34. Tatro classified her 
Facebook posts as literary and satirical expression traditionally covered by the First 
Amendment. Id. at *35. Tatro further alleged that “[t]he mere dissemination of ideas–no 
matter how offensive to good taste–on a state university campus may not be shut off in the 
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Id. at *34 (quoting Papish v. Bd. of Curators of 
Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)).  
 68  Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 813.  In Tinker, two high-school students and one junior-
high student violated school policy when they wore black armbands to school to protest U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam war. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
504 (1969). When they refused to remove the armbands, the students were suspended. Id. The 
Supreme Court subsequently held that the school’s authorities had violated the students’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech because the school had no reason to anticipate a “substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities,” and no such disruption had 
occurred. Id. at 514. Tinker represents the beginning of a long line of United States Supreme 
Court cases which held that schools may limit or discipline student expression only when 
school officials reasonably determine that the otherwise protected First Amendment speech 
will materially and substantially disrupt the school’s work and discipline. See, e.g., Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 513; Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 820.  
 69  Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 822.  
 70  Id. 
12
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disruptions substantial, and upheld the University imposed sanctions citing 
Tinker.71 
 
D. The Final Opinion by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Tatro’s 
case.72 Tatro argued that the Tinker standard, which deals with the regulation 
of speech in high schools, provided an improper framework to analyze the 
discipline of a post-secondary student. 73  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
agreed that Tinker was not the appropriate standard, but affirmed the 
sanctions as constitutional, holding that because the academic rules under 
which the sanctions were imposed were “narrowly tailored” and “directly 
related” to established professional standards, the University did not violate 
Tatro’s free speech rights.74  
                                                 
 71  Id. at 813, 822–23. 
 72  See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 2012). Tatro initially 
sought review solely on the single issue of “[w]hether a public university violates 
constitutional free speech rights by disciplining a student for Facebook posts that contain 
satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience but do not identify or 
threaten anyone.” Id. However, after the court accepted review of Tatro's petition, Tatro 
attempted to further argue in her brief that the University lacked jurisdiction to conduct a 
disciplinary hearing, the University presented insufficient evidence to support the rule 
violations, and the University lacked authority to change a passing grade to a failing grade. Id. 
The Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure require a petitioning party to include a “statement of 
the legal issues sought to be reviewed” in the petition for review. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117, 
subd. 3(a). As a result, the court declined to review the non-constitutional issues that Tatro did 
not specifically raise in her petition for review. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 515. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court allowed for briefing solely on the issue of free speech under the Minnesota 
and federal constitutions. Id. 
 73  Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 
(Minn. 2012) (No. A10-1440), 2011 WL 8203726 at *23. Tatro argued, “[t]he court of appeals 
. . . committed serious error by relying almost exclusively on case law setting forth the 
boundaries of free speech in high schools and junior high schools rather than colleges and 
universities.” Id. Tatro further argued that Healy v. James, which stated that “colleges and 
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment,” established 
that public university students are entitled to the same free speech rights as members of the 
general public. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 517–18 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 
(1972) (stating that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas’”)). Conversely, the University asserted that it may enforce academic 
program rules that are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical objectives of training 
students to enter the funeral director profession without violating the student’s First 
Amendment rights, even when those rules extend to conduct that takes place off campus. Id. at 
518 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (stating that 
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style 
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”)).  
 74  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 510–11, 524. Because the Minnesota constitutional right 
to free speech is coextensive with the First Amendment, the court looked primarily to federal 
law for guidance. Id. at 516 (citing State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 798–801 (Minn. 
1999) (declining to extend the free speech protections of the Minnesota Constitution “beyond 
those protections offered by the First Amendment”)).  
13
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 The court determined that Tinker was inapplicable because the 
driving force behind Tatro’s discipline was not the traditional substantial 
disruption to academic activities, but a violation of program rules pertinent to 
professional standards. 75  The court instead considered the special 
characteristics of the Mortuary Department’s academic environment to 
determine whether punishment of Tatro’s otherwise protected First 
Amendment speech was constitutional.76 The court’s new standard focused 
on the special characteristics of the University’s curricular rules which, 
according to the University, were specifically designed to teach professional 
conduct standards.77 The court reasoned that confining the newly established 
legal standard to solidified professional conduct guidelines would limit a 
university’s ability to create overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly 
reach a student’s personal and unrelated Facebook activity.78  
The court first determined that the University rules were directed to 
professional standards. 79  The court applied the professional standards of 
                                                 
 75  Id. at 519–20. The United States Supreme Court has explained that, in deciding 
the constitutional rights of students, the analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute, but that 
courts must consider the special characteristics of the school environment at issue. Id. at 520 
(quoting Morse v. Fredrick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)). In Morse, the Court considered the 
special circumstances of an off-campus, school sanctioned, and school supervised event, in 
which the student displayed a banner promoting illegal drug use. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393. The 
banner read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS. Id. The superintendent of the school explained that the 
student was disciplined, not because the school disagreed with his message, but because his 
speech appeared to suggest the school advocated the use of illegal drugs. Id. at 398. The 
Supreme Court held that the school’s principal did not violate the student’s First Amendment 
rights by confiscating the banner. Id. at 410. 
 76  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520 (stating that in Morse, the Court concluded that 
governmental interest in stopping student speech allowed the school to confiscate a banner 
promoting illegal drug use from a student off campus during a school sponsored event).  
 77  Id. at 521. The court’s opinion states: 
We acknowledge the concerns expressed by Tatro and 
supporting amici that adoption of a broad rule would allow a 
public university to regulate a student's personal expression at 
any time, at any place, for any claimed curriculum-based reason. 
Nonetheless, the parties agree that a university may regulate 
student speech on Facebook that violates established 
professional conduct standards. This is the legal standard we 
adopt here, with the qualification that any restrictions on a 
student's Facebook posts must be narrowly tailored and directly 
related to established professional conduct standards. 
Id. The court states that the factual situation presented in Tatro has not 
been addressed in any published court decision and, consequently, the 
constitutional standard that applies in the context is unsettled. Id. at 517. 
 78  Id. at 521. “Accordingly, we hold that a university does not violate the free 
speech rights of a student enrolled in a professional program when the university imposes 
sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly tailored 
and directly related to established professional conduct standards.” Id. 
 79  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520 (stating that ethics are a fundamental part of the 
University’s Mortuary program which trains students to be funeral directors and morticians 
14
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morticians and funeral directors in Minnesota, as governed by statute, to 
determine if the University’s rules were reasonably related.80   The court 
concluded that the University, as well as course rules, Tatro was found to 
have violated were directly related to established professional standards that 
require professionals within the mortuary field to treat all individuals 
encountered within the scope of the profession with dignity and respect.81  
The court also determined that the program rules were narrowly 
tailored to the relevant professional standards.82 In examining the scope of 
the program rules, the court considered whether the University’s restrictions 
on the mode, manner, and place of student speech were “substantially 
broader than necessary” to achieve the desired objective. 83  While some 
professional standards are written with very precise language, others, which 
are less detail-oriented, are in practice very broad.84 Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that the University’s sanctions were grounded in narrowly tailored 
rules which regulated widely disseminated Facebook posts because the 
University was not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, but for posts 
that could be viewed by thousands, as well as for sharing the Facebook posts 
                                                                                                                   
and that the University is entitled to set and enforce reasonable course standards designed to 
teach professional norms). 
 80  Id. at 521–22.  
 81  Id. at 522–23. “Giving deference to the curriculum decisions of the University, 
we conclude that the academic program rules imposed on Tatro as a condition of her access to 
human cadavers are directly related to established professional conduct standards.” Id.; see 
also MINN. STAT. §149A.70, subd. 7(3) (2007) (defining unprofessional conduct within the 
mortuary field as failure to treat any person encountered while within the scope of the 
practice, employment, or business with dignity and respect, which the court analyzed in 
Tatro). 
 82  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523.  
 83  Id. (relying on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) which 
held that regulation of time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to 
serve the government’s interests, but need not be the least restrictive means of doing so).  
 84 Compare 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., LAWYERS PROF. RESP. BD., OPINION 21 (2009) 
(giving precise details regarding a lawyer’s duty to consult with a client about the lawyer’s 
own malpractice) with MINN. STAT. § 148B.59 (2007) (allowing revocation of a counselor’s 
license if the professional board determines that the counselor engaged in fraudulent, 
deceptive, or dishonest conduct, whether or not the conduct relates to the practice of licensed 
professional counseling). For example, the University in Tatro stated that their undergraduate 
and graduate programs intended to educate students for entry into the many professions that 
carry with them obligations of discretion, confidentiality, and professionalism. Tatro, 816 
N.W.2d at 520 (noting that the driving force behind the University’s discipline was not a 
substantial disruption, as in Tinker, but that Tatro’s Facebook posts violated established 
program rules that required respect, discretion, and confidentiality in connection with work on 
human cadavers). To prepare students for those professions, the University must train them in 
the ethical and professional standards to which they will be held. Id. The court in Tatro, 
however, did not specify whether constitutional interference with a student’s otherwise 
protected First Amendment speech by a university’s application of “narrowly tailored” and 
“directly related” university rules would also apply to broadly professional standards or only 
those which are also “narrowly tailored.” Id. at 521–22. 
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with the media. 85  Applying the narrowly tailored and directly related 
standards, the court determined that the Mortuary Science Program rules 
required students to conduct themselves accordingly and that punishment for 
violation of such standards did not violate Tatro’s First Amendment rights.86 
 Tatro’s attorney, Jordan Kushner, stated in an interview with a 
Minneapolis newspaper, The Star Tribune, that Tatro wanted to appeal her 
case to the United States Supreme Court.87 However, Tatro died just days 
after the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its opinion.88 Jordan Kushner has 
recently begun another lawsuit which is, at first glance, seemingly similar to 
Tatro’s, in what appears to be his ongoing attempt to assert that Facebook is 
the student’s and not the public university’s, “business.”89  
                                                 
 85  Id. at 523 (holding that the school’s rules prohibiting blogging about cadaver 
dissection were not substantially broader than necessary to achieve desired results).  
 86  Id. at 523. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
In this case, the University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private 
conversation, but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by 
thousands of Facebook users and for sharing the Facebook posts 
with the news media. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
University's sanctions were grounded in narrowly tailored rules 
regulating widely disseminated Facebook posts. 
Id. The court further noted that courts have previously considered the 
severity of punishment in student speech cases and, in Tatro’s case, she 
was not expelled or even suspended from the Mortuary program, but 
instead continued within the Mortuary Science Program with a failing 
grade in one laboratory course. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524. 
 87  Abby Simmons, U Grad in Facebook Case Dies, STAR TRIB., June 26, 2012.  
 88  Id. Tatro was thirty-one when she passed away. Id. Kushner described Tatro as 
“largely bionic” due to a condition which affected her nervous system. Id. Tatro, prior to her 
death, graduated from the University’s Mortuary Science Program. Id. According to Kushner, 
she had a difficult time finding work due to her disability. Id. She eventually did find work 
with a funeral home; however, complications from her condition prevented her from working 
fulltime. Simmons, supra note 87. Tatro’s cause-of-death was not released to the media, and 
her family declined to comment. Id. However, Minneapolis police stated that they did not 
consider her death to be suspicious. Id. 
 89  David Hanners, Student Expelled from Brainerd Nursing School for Facebook 
Comment Sues, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 17, 2013. On February 8, 2013, Kushner 
filed a complaint on Craig Keefe’s behalf. Complaint, Keefe v. Adams, 13-CV-00326-JNE-
LIB, (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2013). Keefe, who was just one semester away from finishing his 
degree to become a registered nurse, was expelled for allegedly posting the phrase “stupid 
bitch” on his Facebook page, as well as another comment about there not being enough 
whiskey for anger management. Id. at 5. Keefe alleges in his complaint: 
Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff 
Craig Keefe of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, specifically in violation of his First Amendment 
Rights to Free Speech, by removing him from an academic 
program because of he exercised of his basic and fundamental 
right to free expression on his personal time and in a context 
that has nothing to do with his obligations as a student. 
Id. at 9. The complaint further states: 
16
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The Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of otherwise 
protected, off-campus speech.90 While some courts have allowed both K-12, 
as well as post-secondary schools, to regulate and sanction students for 
speech occurring on the Internet, others have found this activity 
unconstitutional.91 In response to these inconsistent or potentially undesirable 
results, state legislatures have taken the matter into their own hands to limit 






                                                                                                                   
[The school administrator] then asked Keefe for an explanation, 
while refusing to let him see the documents. Keefe stated that 
the comment about whiskey was a joke, that his Facebook 
account had been hacked a couple of weeks ago and he had tried 
to delete comments which had been posted. [The administrator] 
then told Keefe that he was going to be removed from the 
nursing program. She held up a stack of papers which was 
allegedly Keefe’s entire Facebook page and told him she had 
read the whole page and found it disturbing. [She] refused to 
allow Keefe to see the documents. [She] also refused to tell 
Keefe how she accessed his private Facebook page, but stated 
she realized it was a violation of his First Amendment rights. 
Id. at 5. Keefe further asserts that the University deprived him of his right 
to due process when the expulsion took place without notice or the 
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 8. 
 90  Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the 
Future of the First Amendment – TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 165–67 (2009) 
(stating that recent Supreme Court cases regarding student speech are limited to on-campus 
activity or speech which occurred off school grounds, but during a school-supervised event 
and that the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the contours of a student’s free 
speech rights when such speech originates off campus).   
 91  Compare Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 510–11(holding that the University did not 
violate Tatro’s free speech rights because the academic program rules under which the 
sanctions were imposed were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional 
conduct standards) with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (holding that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has ever 
allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school sponsored or at a 
school-sponsored event, and because under the Tinker standard the district could not have 
reasonably foreseen an on-campus substantial disruption would have occurred, the school 
district should not have punished the student for creating a fake MySpace.com profile using 
her principle’s picture and accusing him of being a pedophile and sex addict outside of school, 
during non-school hours). 
 92  David L. Hudson Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing 
Students’, Workers’ Social Media, 98-NOV A.B.A. J. 22, 22–23 (2012) (stating that 
counteracting legislation arose in a number of states in 2012 to prohibit academic institutions 
from requiring students or applicants for admission to disclose passwords or account related 
information to gain access to the student’s social media profiles). 
17
Johnson: Tatro v. University of Minnesota
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
328 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
 
A. Modern Social Media 
 Social networking has revolutionized the way people communicate.93 
Individuals can, and do, access Facebook and MySpace wherever they go.94 
To some, technology is not a tool, but literally a way of life. 95  Social 
networking websites allow an individual to post pictures and information 
about themselves at the touch of a button.96 The reality, however, is that 
nothing a person posts on Facebook remains completely confidential.97 
 MySpace was one of the nation’s earliest widespread social 
networking websites.98 MySpace co-founder, Tom Anderson, believed that 
MySpace’s success was due, in part, to its appeal to those he termed 
“fakesters.”99 So-called fakesters could create a personal profile on MySpace 
using any identity they liked by making their page look any way they 
wanted. 100  However, because MySpace allowed members the ability to 
portray themselves as anyone, it made limiting connections to genuine 
friends difficult for users.101  MySpace also became known for its sexual 
influences.102 The website’s policy required users to be at least sixteen, but 
                                                 
 93  See Browning, supra note 5, at 842 (discussing the discipline of student-
athletes for information shared on social networking websites).  
 94  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that at one point, cell phones and 
internet were banned in certain places like, for example, courthouses, but now social 
institutions have largely accepted the prevalent use of technology and abandoned restrictions 
on use).  
 95  LARRY D. ROSEN, REWIRED: UNDERSTANDING THE ¡GENERATION AND THE WAY 
THEY LEARN 27 (2010). The author states that when he asked a friend’s daughter why she 
liked technology so much, the daughter replied: “What do you mean why do I like 
technology? Isn’t everything technology? I guess I don’t even think about it. It’s sorta like the 
sky, ya know. I don’t think about the sky. I just know that when I look up it’s there. Same 
with technology. It’s just everywhere.” Id. 
 96  KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 75–76 (noting that social networking sites, like 
MySpace, allow a user to have control over what information is posted). 
 97  Id. at 204 (explaining that the company’s privacy statement reads that any of an 
individual’s personal data “may become publically available” after being posted on 
Facebook). 
 98  Id. at 77 (discussing the introduction and evolution of social networking).  
 99  Id. at 74–75 (suggesting that MySpace was different from its competition 
Friendster by allowing members to create their one webpage designs and being less rigid 
about who could join than other social networks). 
 100  Id. (noting that users were able to create profiles using any identity they liked 
because co-founders Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolfe put very few restrictions on how 
subscribers could use the website).  
 101  Id. at 75 (suggesting that some people began adding friends regardless of 
whether they knew them almost in a competitive way because the more friends you had, the 
better). 
 102  KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 75–76 (stating that because MySpace advertised 
to nightclubs and bands and had few restrictions for its users, Myspace became known as a 
“digital club” where wild behavior was welcome).  
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many younger teens and children created profiles.103 In February, 2004, the 
same month Facebook was launched to the first group of eligible students at 
Harvard University, MySpace was becoming the nation’s dominant social 
networking website with more than one million members.104  
 Conversely, Facebook, originally known as TheFacebook, offered 
users limited functionality and personalization when compared to 
MySpace.105 One of the most notable differences, at the time of launch, was 
that Facebook was only available to students enrolled at elite universities.106 
Unlike MySpace, privacy restrictions ensured that Facebook users were 
likely connecting to real people who were accurately portraying 
themselves. 107  As time progressed, the social networking site became 
available to non-students, and by September, 2008, Facebook reached 100 
million active users world-wide.108  As Facebook expanded, the company 
relaxed the website’s strict privacy settings, and personal and private user 
information is now shared by Facebook with its partner websites and used to 
target advertisers.109 
 With the help of Facebook and MySpace, social networking has 
drastically changed the way in which students communicate with one 
another.110 However, as individuals continue to utilize technology making 
their private information and thoughts widely accessible, it remains unclear 
                                                 
 103  Id. (explaining that it was not unusual for girls as young as thirteen to post 
pictures of themselves wearing only undergarments and parents across the country became 
increasingly alarmed about the dangers of social media).  
 104  Id. at 77 (discussing the reputation of MySpace prior to Facebook’s launch in 
2004).  
 105  Id. at 77 (explaining that Facebook, or what was then called TheFacebook, had 
a contrasting tone to MySpace because it limited users’ ability to customize their personal 
pages). 
 106  Id. (explaining that Facebook was the first social network created exclusively 
for college students). 
 107  Id. at 83 (expressing that later lawsuits alleged Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckurberg stole the idea of a college-centered social networking site which would require 
users to register with their “.edu” email addresses to ensure safe connections).  
 108  KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 303 (discussing the growth of Facebook.com 
and the on-going efforts by its CEO Mark Zuckerberg to keep the website relevant and 
growing).  
 109  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 126 (explaining the erosion of Facebook’s privacy 
policy from 2005 through April, 2010). Although we may sign on to our social networking 
sites believing them to be a private place, personal information is routinely pulled from our 
social networking pages. Id. Andrews argues that social networking companies waited to pull 
the rug out from under users by changing their policies on private information only after so 
many users were “hooked.” Id.  
 110  ROSEN, supra note 95, at 27 (stating that preteens and teens are accessing and 
using technology at all hours of the day).  
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exactly what rules and principles should govern this new social networking 
nation.111 
 
B. Striking the Balance: First Amendment Speech in Public K-12 School 
Systems 
 The United States Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment 
student speech rights in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District.112 The Court began its opinion by stating, “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” however, “the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive 
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”113 
Therefore, when a student’s exercise of First Amendment speech conflicts 
with the rules of their respective public schools, courts are required to 
reconcile the two important but competing interests.114 
 Tinker concerned the potential impact students’ display of black 
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War had on both a school’s productivity, 
as well as the rights of other students to be secure.115 Faculty and staff had no 
indication that the armbands would interfere with the school’s work or the 
non-protesting students’ rights and, therefore, the school had no reason to 
anticipate a substantial disruption to productivity.116 The school’s desire to 
avoid a disagreement in opinion regarding hot button topics among its 
students was not enough to allow them to silence student speech on 
campus.117 Because the school district was unable to point to any specific 
instances of violence or threats of violence as a result of the students’ display 
of their black armbands, the Court held the resulting suspensions were 
unconstitutional.118  
                                                 
 111  See ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the very structure of social 
networking websites like Facebook prevent an individual from reinventing themselves, and 
that pictures and information posted can be perpetually used against an individual).  
 112  Benjamin T. Bradford, Is it Really MySpace? Our Disjointed History of Public 
School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L. 
J. 323, 326 (2010) (discussing Tinker as the first case in which the Supreme Court was asked 
to determine the limits of a public school student's First Amendment right to expression). 
 113  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969). 
 114  Id. at 507. 
 115  Id. at 508.  
 116  Id. at 509–10. A few students made hostile remarks to the students; however, 
no threats or acts of violence took place on the school’s premises. Id. at 508. 
 117  Id. at 509. “In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 118  Id. at 508. The Court further explained that the Tinker principle is applicable 
not only to the supervised speech that takes place in the classroom, but speech throughout the 
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 Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has upheld limited regulation of 
student expression in public grade schools. 119  Accordingly, school 
administrators have limited discretion in disciplining on-campus student 
speech. 120  Supreme Court precedent suggests that at least four types of 
student speech may be regulated in public grade schools: on-campus speech 
that materially and substantially disrupts school activities; on-campus lewd 
or offensive speech; speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs; and 
finally, speech which falls into one of the prior three categories and occurs at 
school-sponsored events (presumably off campus).121 Currently, the Court 
has declined to hear any major appeal involving student speech that occurs 
entirely off campus, including the Internet speech of either a K-12 or post-
secondary student.122 
Silence by the Supreme Court on the issue of off-campus student 
speech has led to the monitoring and punishment of students for 
communication on social networking websites by many public K-12 schools 
                                                                                                                   
inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours, such as in the cafeteria or on 
athletic fields, to accommodate the students required by law to attend. Id. at 512–13. 
 119  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988) (holding that 
two high school principals’ decision to remove two pages from a student newspaper on the 
ground that the articles unfairly impinged on privacy rights of pregnant students did not 
violate student writers’ First Amendment speech rights); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675, 685–86 (1986) (determining that a school district did not violate a student’s First 
Amendment rights to free speech when it expelled him for referring to a fellow student in 
terms of elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual language during a school assembly). 
 120  Bradford, supra note 112, at 331 (noting that while schools have been given 
more power to censor student speech occurring on campus, it is important to note that the 
Supreme Court has yet to rule on student speech occurring off campus, after school hours). 
 121  Id. (discussing that there are at least four types of student speech which clearly 
regulate student speech occurring on campus in public grade schools); see also Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007) (holding that while Tinker warned that schools may 
not prohibit student speech because of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, a 
school district did not offend a student’s constitutional rights following his display of a sign 
promoting illegal drug use at a school sponsored event); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73 
(holding that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish 
student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to 
lend its name and resources to student expression and that  lewd and offensive speech in a 
school newspaper could be censored and punished with expulsion without violating a 
student’s First Amendment rights); Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 688–89 (holding that, 
although vulgar speech at an assembly is unlike Tinker in that it does not concern political 
viewpoints, the First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining under 
the same standard that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission). 
 122  See Bradford, supra note 112, at 331–33 (arguing that Supreme Court 
precedent provides “ample rationale as to why schools must be allowed to control student 
expression at school, but when the tests outlined in those cases are extended to student speech 
occurring at places and times when the students are no longer under school supervision, the 
logic behind each of the tests begins to crack, if not completely crumble . . . [h]owever, 
because the Court did not outline a method for determining how speech that occurs off 
campus can become school speech, lower courts were left to formulate their own tests”).  
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across the country.123 Conversely, however, some public K-12 schools have 
struggled to hold students accountable for gross violations of curricular 
rules.124 In both Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District and Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
student who ridicules a school principal online cannot be punished by school 
authorities when the speech occurs entirely off campus and does not 
substantially disrupt school activities.125 
 
1. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District and Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District  
In Snyder, a Pennsylvania middle school student was suspended 
following her creation, from her home computer, of an Internet profile on 
MySpace.com, using her principal’s photograph. 126  The profile did not 
identify the principal by name, school, or location; however, it presented a 
parody depicting a bisexual Alabama middle school principal named “M-
Hoe.”127 Statements made on the MySpace.com profile insinuated, among 
other things, that the principal was both a sex addict and a pedophile.128  
Similarly, in Layshock, a high school student, using his 
grandmother’s home computer, created a fake MySpace.com profile for his 
principal containing the principal’s first and last name, his photograph from 
the school district’s website, and fabricated answers to survey questions 
                                                 
 123  Hudson, supra note 92, at 22–23 (arguing that there are multiple incidents 
throughout the nation where schools are invading the privacy rights of K-12 students by 
observing their social media pages).  
 124  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933–40 (3d Cir. 
2011) (holding that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has ever allowed 
schools to punish students for off-campus speech that does not occur at a school-sponsored 
event, and because under the Tinker standard the district could not have reasonably foreseen 
an on-campus substantial disruption would have occurred, the school district should not have 
punished the student for creating a fake MySpace.com profile using her principle’s picture and 
accusing him of being a pedophile and sex addict outside of school, during non-school hours); 
see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (deciding, as in 
Snyder, that a school district’s limited authority to punish off-campus conduct does not extend 
to suspending a student for the creation of an equally vulgar fake MySpace.com account using 
a student’s high school principal’s full name and photograph). 
 125  Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 (stating that the school district could not have 
reasonably foreseen that a substantial, on-campus disruption would have occurred); see also 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (stating “[w]e need not now define the precise parameters of when 
the arm of authority can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because, as we noted earlier, the 
district court found that Justin’s conduct did not disrupt the school”). 
 126  Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. 
 127  Id. 
 128  See id. at 921. For example, the “About Me” portion of the profile read as 
follows: “HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, sex 
addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] . . . I love children, sex (any 
kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my darling 
wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) . . . .” Id. (alteration in original).  
22
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/14
2013] TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 333 
 
 
intended to assist users in creating their account.129 The student answered the 
“tell me about yourself” questions to include answers such as: “Birthday: too 
drunk to remember”; “Are you a health freak: big steroid freak”; “In the past 
month have you smoked: big blunt”; “In the past month have you gone 
Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick”; etc.130  
In an attempt to follow Tinker and subsequent student speech cases, 
the Third Circuit held in both cases that because the students’ creation of the 
MySpace.com profiles did not cause a substantial disruption within the 
schools, the districts violated the students’ First Amendment rights when 
they suspended them for making the MySpace pages.131  The two school 
districts filed a joint appeal to the United States Supreme Court following the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions.132 The petition argued: 
 
The legal uncertainty is generating tremendous 
confusion and wasting resources in thousands of 
school districts across the country, where these 
issues arise on nearly a daily basis. At the moment, 
school officials are stuck between a rock and a hard 
place: They are responsible for protecting students 
and teachers from online harassment, but in doing 
so, they might trigger a lawsuit from a student 
claiming that his or her First Amendment rights 
have been violated. School officials cannot afford to 
wait any longer for a definitive answer.133  
On January 17, 2012, the Supreme Court denied the parties’ petition for writ 
of certiorari.134 Although both Snyder and Layshock concern student 
harassment of a principal, educators and parents have grown increasingly 
concerned, as similar incidents directed at classmates have had harmful 
effects on youth.135  
                                                 
 129  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08.  
 130  Id. at 208.  
 131  Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 (stating that there was no reasonably foreseeable 
disruption the district could have anticipated); see also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (stating that 
the student’s conduct did not disrupt the school and that none of the narrow circumstances that 
would allow the school to punish for off-campus conduct occurred).  
 132  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, No. 11-
502 (Oct. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 5014761 at *1. 
 133  Id. at *2–3. 
 134  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 
1097 (Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-502). The United States Supreme Court did not provide any 
explanation for the denial. Id. 
 135  NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING TO 
THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 1 (2007) (discussing 
strategies for school administrators, counselors, psychologists, school resource officers, 
teachers, and others in dealing with cyberbullying and cyberthreats among youth). Children 
and youth who are targets of bullying can become tense, anxious, and afraid. Id. at 47. 
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2. Cyberbullying in K-12 Public Schools  
 Nancy Willard, executive director of the Center for Safe and 
Responsible Internet Use, defines cyberbullying as the sending or posting of 
harmful or aggressive material using the Internet or other digital 
technology. 136  She further defines cyberthreats to include the sending or 
posting of direct threats that suggest the student may be considering 
committing an act of violence against him or herself, or another person.137 As 
young students become increasingly connected to the Internet and digital 
technology, educators are faced with challenging issues when off-campus 
cyberbullying and cyberthreats, which may be considered protected speech, 
affect students on campus.138 Educators are left with uncertain standards to 
determine when they can intervene in cases of off-campus cyberbullying.139  
 Cyberbullying is a relatively new phenomenon.140 As a result, its 
effects have not been widely studied and results of limited studies are largely 
inconsistent.141 The prevalence of cyberbullying and cyberthreats is largely 
unknown due, in part, to the fact that children and teens rarely report the 
abuse.142 Unlike traditional on-campus bullying, cyberbullying can occur at 
any time of the day or night, making it often inescapable for victims.143 
Cyberbullies are also often able to remain completely anonymous, saying 
                                                                                                                   
Bullying can have long-term consequences, even years after the bullying has stopped. Id. at 
48. Adults who were bullied as children have higher levels of depression and poorer self-
esteem than other their age. Id. It is possible that the effects of cyberbullying can be more 
emotionally damaging than traditional bullying for a number of reasons including that targets 
of in-school bullying have the ability to escape when at home, while cyberbullying can occur 
at all hours of the day. Id.    
 136  Id. at 1. Willard provides a number of examples illustrative of how 
cyberbullying may occur including the following example: “Mary, an obese high school 
student, was changing in the locker room after gym class. Jessica took a covert picture of her 
with her cell phone camera. Within seconds, the picture was flying around the cell phones at 
school.” WILLARD, supra note 135, at 1. 
 137  Id. at 2. However, different researchers have labeled specific acts including 
cyberbullying and cyberthreats differently. Id. at 32.  
 138  Id. at 2. 
 139  Id. at 101. 
 140  Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict 
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2003) (suggesting 
that although the use of the Internet to bully is a relatively new phenomenon, the only real 
difference between cyberbullying and traditional bullying is that it takes place on the Internet). 
 141 WILLARD, supra note 135, at 32 (stating that it is probable that inconsistencies 
in the limited studies that have taken place on cyberbullying may be due, in part, to the 
differences in labeling for specific acts). 
 142  Id. at 49 (suggesting that many teens think the adults they would otherwise go 
to for help will not understand the Internet and their online world or know how to respond to 
the bullying and be unable to help). 
 143  Id. at 48 (suggesting that a cyberbully can target their victim any time they use 
a technological device, or even when they are not using the device by creating a defaming 
website that remains visible to others on the Internet at all times). 
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things they might not otherwise say in person as a result.144 Furthermore, 
unlike traditional bullying, Internet-created harassment can make the 
communication widely available and accessible by countless others when 
comments are sent using email or by posting on a public forum such as 
MySpace or Facebook. 145  Finally, hurtful comments may remain on the 
Internet indefinitely, and victims are unable to escape the harassment.146 
Because teens spend an increased amount of time using the Internet to 
communicate, online harassment has become prevalent.147 
Like school administrators who risk violating a student’s First 
Amendment rights by taking action against a cyberbully, educators who do 
not respond to student threats may also risk liability.148 As of 2009, twenty 
states had adopted laws to combat cyberbullying in K-12 public schools.149 
These state laws, however, only cover incidents of cyberbullying within the 
limited authority of public schools over on-campus student speech and, 
therefore, leave cyberbullying that occurs off campus and during after-school 
hours unpunishable.150  Additionally, parents and victimized students may 
bring tort or criminal actions for such harassment in absence of 
cyberbullying laws. 151  Finally, when harmful speech is significantly 
damaging to a student’s emotional well-being and interferes with a student’s 
                                                 
 144  Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the 
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 850 (2010) 
(discussing the evolution of bullying from the playground to the Internet and suggesting that 
the ease of remaining anonymous on the Internet can make it hard for victims to initially 
respond to their bullies).  
 145  Id. (stating that, even worse, some websites are specifically dedicated to online 
criticism and exist solely for cyberbullies to post photos and insulting captions).  
 146  Id. at 850–51 (arguing that the relative ease with which bullies can harass 
online creates disproportionate effects for the target who may be unable to escape the presence 
of a comment that they cannot remove from the Internet).  
 147  WILLARD, supra note 135, at 32 (arguing that despite the difficulty in 
determining precise incident rates of cyberbullying and cyberthreats, such harassment has 
become as great a concern as traditional bullying, if not greater).  
 148  Servance, supra note 140, at 1215. Schools have been held liable for failing to 
respond to instances of peer-to-peer harassment. Id. Following the Columbine shootings, 
parents of survivors and families of students who were killed sued the Jefferson County 
school district in Colorado for failing to protect their children from peer-to-peer danger. Id. at 
1215 n.11. See, e.g., Peter G. Chronis, Victims' Cases Seen as Rocky Ground for Lawyers, 
DENVER POST, May 21, 1999, at A7. 
 149  King, supra note 144, at 858; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 121A.0695 (2007) 
(stating “[e]ach school board shall adopt a written policy prohibiting intimidation and bullying 
of any student. The policy shall address intimidation and bullying in all forms, including, but 
not limited to, electronic forms and forms involving Internet use”). 
 150  King, supra note 144, at 860 (arguing that these laws apply only to peer-to-peer 
harassment and that non-students cannot be punished by a school district they do not attend).  
 151  Id. at 852 (suggesting that this is not a sufficient remedy for victims of 
cyberbullying because tort and criminal laws are not specifically designed to counteract 
Internet harassment).  
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ability to learn, courts may be inclined to support district intervention under 
the material and substantial disruption language set forth in Tinker.152  
School officials are not helpless, however, even when questioned 
speech does not fall under enacted state cyberbullying statutes, tort law, or 
criminal law. 153  Informal intervention, without punishment, to address 
incidents of cyberbullying may provide an effective solution for a K-12 
administration seeking to avoid liability for the suppression of First 
Amendment rights.154 Educators can do this by informally involving parents, 
school counselors, teachers, and school staff.155  
 
C. The Monitoring of College Applicants’ and Student-Athletes’ Social 
Media Accounts by Public Universities 
 As social networking websites have grown, access to the information 
they contain has become increasingly simple for post-secondary educational 
institutions and programs. 156  Some state legislatures have responded by 
forbidding post-secondary and K-12 schools from monitoring students’ 
social networking activity.157 
A survey in 2008 revealed that one in every ten college admissions 
officers used social networking websites to view applicant activity as a part 
of their decision-making process. 158  Of the admissions officers viewing 
applicant web pages, thirty-eight percent said that viewing the pages had a 
negative impact on the students’ admissions evaluations.159 Likewise, many 
public colleges and universities across the country are mandating that 
student-athletes install software applications on their computers and wireless 
                                                 
 152  WILLARD, supra note 135, at 114–15 (suggesting that determining whether the 
threat will likely result in a material and substantial disruption requires an assessment of the 
overall situation as well as the degree of harmfulness of the speech). Tinker references a 
public K-12 school’s ability to protect the rights of other students to be let alone and free from 
harm who are required by law to attend during school hours and therefore cannot avoid 
exposure to the offensive speech. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508 (1969). 
 153  WILLARD, supra note 135, at 115–16 (stating that there are ways to intervene 
informally to address incidents of cyberbullying occurring off campus when educators become 
concerned for the impact it is having on students or otherwise on campus). 
 154  Id. at 115. 
 155  Id. 
 156  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 126 (arguing that personal information about social 
network users is routinely viewed without users knowing it as a result of Facebook’s eroding 
privacy policy).   
 157  Browning, supra note 5, at 843 (discussing the response of state legislatures to 
post-secondary monitoring of student speech on social networking websites).  
 158  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing how seemingly innocuous postings 
have been used to make judgments about people by schools, employers, mortgage brokers, 
credit card companies, and many other social institutions). 
 159  Id. One admissions officer stated that a potential applicant had been rejected 
when the officer viewed the student’s posts bragging that he felt he had aced the application 
process for the school, but that he did not feel he wanted to attend. Id. 
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devices which monitor their activity and search for key words suggestive of 
discussion regarding use of alcohol or illegal drugs, obscenities or offensive 
comments, or references to NCAA violations including the offering of bribes 
or solicitation of agents.160  
In an attempt to protect students, legislatures in Maryland, Delaware, 
and California have passed legislation forbidding both K-12, as well as post-
secondary educational institutions and programs, from requiring students to 
provide login information, passwords, or installing monitoring software.161 
Courts have also responded to protect First Amendment interests on social 
media where legislatures have not.162 In one unpublished decision, R.S. v. 
Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149, a Minnesota Federal District 
Court held that school officials violated a student’s First and Fourth 
Amendment rights by forcing her to turn over her Facebook and private 
email passwords.163  
Although universities have considerable reputational and tangible 
interests at stake when admitting students to participate in their educational, 
as well as athletic, programs, constitutional protections do not cease to exist 
for these students.164 With recent legislation prohibiting the monitoring of 
student speech on social networking websites, it is logical to assume that 
similar future statutes may arise to protect the First Amendment rights of 




                                                 
 160  Browning, supra note 5, at 841–42 (arguing that university monitoring of 
potentially objectionable social-networking activity by student athletes requires such students 
to relinquish their right to privacy and protections under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).  
 161  Id. at 843. These laws have largely been inspired by those prohibiting 
employers from forcing employees or job applicants from turning over passwords for social 
media accounts. Id. 
 162  Id. “[W]hile several courts have justified certain invasions of a student-
athlete’s Fourth Amendment rights in cases involving random drug testing, recent decisions in 
the digital age have come down on the side of protecting a students [sic] right to expression 
via social media.” Id. 
 163  R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, Civ. No. 12-588 (MJD/LIB), 
2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding that if the facts alleged in the 
complaint are true, the Minnesota middle-school student’s constitutional rights were violated 
by requiring she provide her Facebook password); Browning, supra note 5, at 843 n.9.  
 164  Browning, supra note 5, at 841 (arguing that it becomes tricky for post-
secondary schools and athlete programs for constitutional purposes when the content of a 
student-athlete’s social media page is not materially or substantially disruptive, but may be 
classified as First Amendment speech).  
 165  Id. at 843 (stating that as of December, 2012, ten other states were considering 
legislation similar to California, Illinois, and Maryland’s laws prohibiting schools from 
requiring students to turn over social media passwords).  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 School administrators and students alike need guidance to determine 
what, if any, off-campus Internet speech may be regulated by public 
universities and K-12 school systems. 166  Tatro establishes new and 
dangerous precedent for Minnesota students by suggesting that public 
universities may punish for any violation of a course or campus-wide rule if 
the administration can establish a connection between the violation and a 
correlating professional standard.167 The rule the University claimed Tatro 
violated was not only overly broad; it was undefinable even by faculty.168 
Additionally, the professional standards the court believed the Mortuary 
Department rules sought to teach and enforce were vague, subjective, and 
nearly all-inclusive. 169  Some courts have held the opposite of Tatro, 
however, and have reasoned that K-12 students cannot be punished for 
speech taking place off campus unless a resulting material disruption occurs 
on campus. 170  The First Amendment is deeply rooted within a strong 
commitment to the fundamental principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited.171 No less should be said for a student’s participation in a 
public debate on a social networking website.172 Social networking students 
                                                 
 166  See supra text accompanying note 133 (arguing that the legal uncertainty of 
how schools may treat off-campus Internet speech is generating tremendous confusion and 
wasting resources in thousands of school districts across the country). 
 167  See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing how the Tatro court did 
not specify how broad or narrow the professional rules a University can impose and punish 
under can be). 
 168  See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro’s instructor did not 
respond when asked if she had informed her students what constituted “blogging” during 
orientation, but that she intended it to be an all-encompassing term).   
 169  See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of 
unprofessional conduct of morticians under MINN. STAT. § 149A.70, subd. 7(3), which 
includes any failure to treat any person within the scope of practice, employment, or business 
with dignity and respect as a statutory violation). 
 170  See supra note 91 and accompanying text (holding in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) that because neither the Supreme 
Court nor the Third Circuit has ever allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech 
that is not school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event, and because under the Tinker 
standard the district could not have reasonably foreseen an on-campus substantial disruption 
would have occurred, the school district should not have punished the student for creating a 
fake MySpace.com profile using her principle’s picture and accusing him of being a pedophile 
and sex addict outside of school, during non-school hours). 
 171  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the constitutional 
commitment to freedom of expression remains wide-open and protected despite the fact that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials). 
 172  See supra note 1 and accompanying text (suggesting that social networkers 
deserve the same free speech rights as those offline and there is a necessity to create a social 
networking constitution).  
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must have the ability to connect and speak freely on the Internet except in 
cases of clear threat of harm or danger.173 
 
A. Punishment for Off-Campus Speech is not Interrelated to On-Campus 
Speech and Should not Be Punished as Such 
Supreme Court student speech cases, which have dealt exclusively 
with incidents occurring either on campus or during school-sponsored 
events, are ill-suited to decide off-campus internet speech cases.174 Landmark 
decisions such as Tinker and Morse have afforded educators authority to 
control student speech during school hours, but the logic behind those cases 
does not extend to off-campus student speech. 175  Recent lower court 
decisions are illustrative of this fact. 176  Lower courts have been left to 
formulate their own tests for determining when off-campus speech becomes 
a legitimate educational concern that may be regulated.177 As evidenced by 
decisions like Tatro, Layshock, and Snyder, resulting decisions have been 
largely inconsistent.178 Off-campus Internet speech is unlike the on-campus 
speech that educators in K-12 schools may regulate under Supreme Court 
precedent. 179  Supreme Court student speech cases beginning with Tinker 
seek to protect students who are required by law to attend class and therefore 
cannot avoid an on-campus disruption caused by another classmate without 
allowing educational intervention of the otherwise protected 
                                                 
 173  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating further that since erroneous 
and often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate, they must be protected if 
freedoms of expression are to endure). 
 174  See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has never directly addressed the issue of educational control over or punishment for otherwise 
protected First Amendment student speech).  
 175  See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that the logic behind 
Supreme Court student speech opinions cracks, if not completely crumbles, when applied to 
off-campus student speech). 
 176  See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding that a school district’s 
limited authority to punish off-campus conduct does not extend to suspending a student for the 
off-campus use of a social networking website). 
 177  See supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating that because the Court has 
not outlined a method for determining when off-campus speech can become school speech, 
lower courts have been left to create their own tests). 
 178  See supra text accompanying note 10 (stating that without any guidance from 
the United States Supreme Court, lower court decisions concerning Internet speech have been 
inconsistent); see also supra text accompanying note 91 (explaining that while some courts 
have allowed schools to regulate and sanction students for speech occurring on the Internet, 
others have found such regulation to be an unconstitutional violation of students’ First 
Amendment rights). 
 179  See supra text accompanying note 121 (stating that Supreme Court precedent 
suggests K-12 schools may be able to regulate speech in at least four instances: when it occurs 
on campus and materially disrupts the activities of the school; when the speech occurs on 
campus and is lewd or offensive; when the speech advocates illegal drug use; or when speech 
falls into one of the first three categories and occurs at a school-sponsored event).  
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demonstration.180 K-12 students are not, however, also legally required to 
sign on to the Internet and view what may have been posted by their 
classmates when they return home after school hours.181 Therefore, while 
Tinker seeks to protect students from what they cannot otherwise avoid, the 
same concern does not exist for speech that occurs off campus and online.182 
As a result, cases concerning off-campus speech cannot fully rely upon the 
precedent of Supreme Court opinions regarding on-campus student 
speech.183  
 
1. Authority Afforded by the Supreme Court for Educators Concerning 
On-Campus Students is Limited  
 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that a K-12 public school district 
violated students’ First Amendment rights by suspending them for displaying 
black armbands during school hours in protest of the Vietnam War.184 The 
Court held that because the school had no reason to anticipate a substantial 
and material disruption of school activities, and because no actual substantial 
disruption had occurred, the school could not limit or discipline the students 
for their First Amendment, anti-war expression.185 Under Tinker, speech that 
does or is substantially likely to cause a material and substantial disruption 
on campus may be regulated by a public K-12 school. 186  This type of 
regulation is allowed to protect the rights of other students who are required 
                                                 
 180  See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (referencing Tinker’s holding 
that a public K-12 school must be able to protect the rights of other students to be let alone 
and free from harm when they are required by law to attend during school hours and therefore 
cannot avoid exposure to the offensive speech). 
 181  See supra text accompanying notes 93–111 (discussing the evolution of social 
networking and companies’ such as MySpace and Facebook’s constant attempts to seek new 
members who can choose to access, join, or abstain from using the websites).   
 182  See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (holding that educators must 
be able to protect their students who are required by law to attend classes and cannot 
otherwise avoid offensive First Amendment demonstrations).  
 183  See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme Court 
student speech precedent cannot be properly applied to off-campus student speech). 
 184  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing that when the students 
refused, upon request, to remove their armbands, the administration subsequently suspended 
the students).  
 185  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (stating that Tinker represents the 
beginning of a long line of United States Supreme Court precedent requiring the anticipation 
or occurrence of a material and substantial disruption on campus to justify suppression of 
otherwise protected First Amendment student speech). 
 186  See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the Tinker principle 
is applicable not only to the supervised speech that takes place in the classroom, but speech 
throughout the inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours such as in the 
cafeteria or on athletic fields). 
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by law to attend and therefore cannot otherwise avoid exposure to the 
offensive and disruptive speech.187 
In Morse, the Supreme Court considered the special circumstances 
of off-campus student speech occurring during a school-sanctioned and 
school-supervised event.188 During the event, a student displayed a banner 
promoting illegal drug use.189 The superintendent later explained that the 
student was disciplined for refusing to take down the banner not because the 
school disagreed with the message the student wished to convey, but because 
the banner’s presence appeared to suggest the school supported the use of 
illegal drugs.190 The Court held that, due to the special characteristics of the 
school environment at issue in Morse, the school had not violated the 
student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating his banner.191 
 
2. The Concerns Surrounding On-Campus Speech Are not Present in Off-
Campus Student Speech Cases 
Amanda Tatro’s Facebook posts do not present the same concerns 
protected by the Supreme Court in Tinker or Morse. 192  Nonetheless, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively on Tinker, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on Morse, in reaching 
their opinions. 193  Unlike what is required under the Tinker standard for 
suppression of otherwise protected student expression, Tatro’s posts did not 
                                                 
 187  See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that educators must be 
able to regulate student speech that causes a substantial and material disruption on campus to 
accommodate the students required by law to attend). 
 188  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding under Morse that the court 
may consider the special circumstances of off-campus, school sanctioned, and supervised 
events).  
 189  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that the banner read “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS).  
 190  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that due to the fact that the 
event was school-sponsored and supervised, the speech appeared to suggest the school also 
advocated the use of illegal drugs).  
 191  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding that the Tinker standard 
requiring a material and substantial disruption on campus is not absolute, and the court may 
consider the school environment at issue). 
 192  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that a banner soliciting 
illegal drug use could constitutionally be confiscated from a student because its presence 
otherwise appeared to suggest the school advocated the illegal activity); see also supra note 
68 and accompanying text (stating that Tinker represents the first of many Supreme Court 
cases requiring a material and substantial disruption on campus in order to justify suppression 
of student speech). 
 193  See supra text accompanying note 69 (explaining that the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals applied Tinker’s substantial and material disruption to Tatro’s case); see also supra 
note 75 and accompanying text (stating that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Morse 
and held that the substantial and material disruption standard is not absolute and that the court 
must consider the special characteristics of the school environment at issue). 
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result in a material and substantial disruption with school activities.194 In 
fact, before the Facebook posts were brought to the Mortuary Department’s 
attention, Tatro had written “I heart Bernie” on the blackboard in her 
laboratory classroom in reference to the cadaver.195 The same instructor who 
found Tatro’s nickname for the donor offensive did not, at that time, tell 
Tatro she felt her actions were inappropriate or a violation of school rules.196 
Class continued, undisrupted, as usual despite the fact that the speech was 
nearly the same as that at issue in Tatro’s Facebook posts.197 Unlike public 
K-12 students protected under Tinker, Tatro’s classmates were not required 
by law to attend during school hours and therefore unable to avoid exposure 
to her speech.198 Unlike a K-12 student, any one of Tatro’s classmates could 
have left to avoid her offensive comments if they had occurred during class 
or on campus.199 Therefore, Tatro’s classmates did not require the protection 
of the University if they felt Tatro’s comments were unpleasant.200  
Likewise, Tatro’s Facebook posts do not fit squarely within the 
precedent set forth by Morse.201 Unlike the student in Morse who displayed a 
banner during a school-supervised and sponsored event, the presence of the 
Facebook posts on Tatro’s personal page did not suggest the University 
would be seen as an advocate or supporter of her opinions.202 A student who 
posts on a blog or webpage speaks not to the limited audience of a 
classroom, but an immeasurable group of social networkers. 203  More 
                                                 
 194  See supra note 20 and accompanying text (holding that a material and 
substantial interference with school activities is required for a school to discipline a student 
for otherwise protected speech). 
 195  See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro had written “I 
heart Bernie” on the blackboard of her laboratory classroom).  
 196  See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro was never told 
by the instructor that her reference was inappropriate and no material disruption occurred as a 
result of Tatro’s on-campus conduct).   
 197  See supra text accompanying notes 44–50 (demonstrating that it was not until 
December 11, 2009, when one of Tatro’s classmates brought her Facebook activity to the 
attention of a professor, that the Mortuary Department became concerned and notified campus 
police).  
 198  See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the Tinker principle 
is applicable to the inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours required by 
law). 
 199  See supra note 118 and accompanying text (holding that Tinker applies not 
only to speech that occurs in the classroom, but during school hours while K-12 students are 
performing other activities).  
 200  See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro stressed she made 
the posts off campus). 
 201  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding in Morse that an 
educational institution does not violate a student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating a 
banner when its presence suggests school-sponsored support). 
 202  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing that a banner promoting 
illegal drug use alludes to support by the school when present at a school-supervised and 
school-sponsored activity). 
 203  See supra text accompanying note 108 (discussing that in September, 2008, 
Facebook reached 100 million active users and strives to keep growing); see also supra note 
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importantly, a student who expresses an unpopular opinion on a social 
networking webpage does not do so as a member of an educational 
institution, but as one of millions participating in the ongoing exchange of 
information online.204 Allowing a post-secondary university to regulate what 
its students say, removed from the classroom or any school-sponsored event, 
means that every Internet post containing any form of speech, written or 
otherwise, may be scrutinized against the educational goals of the 
university. 205  As demonstrated by inconsistent lower court opinions, 
Supreme Court precedent does not support punishment for the wide-range of 
potential behavior that occurs online.206 
Unlike the Tatro court, the Third Circuit found in Layshock and 
Snyder that a school district’s limited authority under the First Amendment 
to restrict student speech should not be extended to off-campus speech 
without Supreme Court guidance.207 The Third Circuit reached this result 
interpreting the same cases that the Tatro court considered. 208  The 
inconsistencies in lower court decisions have inevitably led to confusion for 
both students as well as public educational institutions.209 Furthermore, the 
decisions demonstrate that on-campus speech is unlike off-campus speech 
and the two cannot be treated synonymously.210 The Court has left public 
schools puzzled as they attempt to determine for themselves when they may 
                                                                                                                   
59 and accompanying text (stating that according to a study done in 2012, the average 
Facebook user has 245 “friends” and that users reach an average of 150,000 other people 
through friends of friends when they publish a post). 
 204  See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that the average 
Facebook user has about 245 friends who they select to share personal information with on 
Facebook). 
 205  See supra note 78 and accompanying text (holding that a university may punish 
a student for what it believes to be a violation of university rules that are narrowly tailored and 
directly related to professional standards). 
 206  See supra text accompanying notes 132–134 (discussing the confusion that 
exists for educators attempting to apply on-campus precedent to off-campus Internet speech 
cases). 
 207  See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding that the creation of a 
vulgar fake MySpace profile using a principal’s full name does not justify a public school’s 
punishment of a student). 
 208  See supra notes 124–125, 131 and accompanying text (reasoning that because 
the Supreme Court has never allowed a school to punish student conduct occurring off campus 
unless during a school-sponsored event as in Morse, and because no substantial disruption 
occurred on campus under the Tinker standard, the Third Circuit would not attempt to extend 
those cases to the off-campus conduct that occurred in Layshock and Snyder).  
 209 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (arguing that inconsistent lower court 
opinions are largely a result of difficulty in applying student-speech precedent to off-campus 
cases). 
 210  See supra text accompanying note 133 (explaining that such inconsistences 
have resulted in wasted resources and fear of being sued in response to punishment of a 
student for their off-campus Internet conduct). 
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reach beyond the schoolhouse gate to regulate and discipline for speech 
occurring off campus.211  
 
B. Professional Standards and University Rules are Not Meant to be 
Enforced by a University Acting as a Facebook “Friend” 
No matter how fair and impartial a particular educational forum may 
seem, giving educators and staff the green light to regulate off-campus 
Internet speech, so long as it relates to a course or university rule and 
corresponding professional standard, will unavoidably result in ill-motivated 
or illegitimate means of student punishment.212 The United States Supreme 
Court has consistently held that shocking or overtly distasteful speech 
remains protected under the First Amendment.213 While a student would 
hope that the majority of educators and administrative staff would be 
trustworthy, the First Amendment seeks to protect against the select few who 
will undoubtedly abuse their authority.214 
 
1. Legislative Movement to Prevent Monitoring by Public Universities of 
College Students’ Demonstrates Legislative Interest to Protect the First 
Amendment 
 Although universities have significant interests at stake in the 
admission of students to their educational, as well as athletic programs, 
students have an equally, if not more, important interest in maintaining their 
constitutional freedom of expression.215 If years later, public universities are 
able to review past social networking activity prior to admitting a new 
applicant, legal yet offensive First Amendment activity may prevent an 
                                                 
 211  See supra text accompanying note 133 (describing the tremendous confusion 
and wasted resources in thousands of school districts across the country attempting to address 
issues arising from off-campus speech). 
 212  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that student interests are 
often at odds with faculty interests, and that often these differences in value, view, and 
ideology ask for change directly in the tradition of the First Amendment).  
 213  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (holding that the word “fuck” is 
protected because of its cognitive force and that erroneous and unpleasant statements must be 
protected if freedoms of expression are expected to endure); see also supra note 117 and 
accompanying text (holding that for the State to justify prohibition of a particular expression, 
it must be able to identify something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular viewpoint). 
 214  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (stating the United States Supreme 
Court has held that school authorities violated students’ First Amendment right to free speech 
when it suspended them for making a political statement on campus). 
 215  See supra text accompanying note 164 (explaining that universities have both 
tangible as well as reputational interests at stake when they admit a student into their 
university or athletic program, as well as when they offer that student a financial benefit to 
attend). 
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individual from obtaining a college degree or financial scholarship.216 Posts 
published by future students could remain online for decades to come 
making it nearly impossible for children to reinvent themselves as adults.217 
State legislatures in Maryland, Delaware, and California have passed 
legislation prohibiting universities from requiring students to waive their 
First Amendment rights and provide their public schools with passwords, 
login information, or install monitoring software. 218  This movement 
demonstrates a legitimate legislative interest in protecting the constitutional 
rights of both K-12, as well as post-secondary, students by preventing 
universities from using Facebook and MySpace as a tool to monitor current 
and future students.219 As many as ten other states have considered adopting 
similar legislation.220 
College applicants’ personal information is viewed routinely by the 
admission departments of many public colleges.221 Admissions departments 
have, as a result of what they view on a student’s Facebook or MySpace 
account, chosen not to admit otherwise qualified students. 222  Similarly, 
colleges with athletic programs have gone as far as requiring student athletes 
to waive their First Amendment rights and install spy software on to their 
personal computers.223 Such software can monitor the student’s activity on 
social networking websites and search for key-words that they have used 
which may suggest the student is discussing illegal drug use, alcohol use, or 
using obscene or offensive language.224  Additionally, the software’s key-
                                                 
 216  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (suggesting that parents became 
alarmed concerning the potential repercussions of their children’s actions). 
 217  See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that Facebook provides 
that users’ public information may become publically available after being posted). 
 218  See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text (explaining that such laws 
were largely inspired by similar legislation preventing employers from requiring the same 
information from their employees). 
 219  See supra text accompanying notes 161–162 (explaining that there has been a 
response by state legislatures to protect students from the monitoring of their private activity 
on social networking websites by their public schools and universities).  
 220  See supra note 161 and accompanying text (suggesting that as of December, 
2012, these were the only three states to enact the student aimed legislation); see also supra 
note 165 and accompanying text (stating that as of December, 2012, ten other states were 
considering legislation similar to the laws discussed above of Maryland, Delaware, and 
California).  
 221  See supra text accompanying notes 158–160 (discussing a 2008 survey which 
revealed that one in ten public universities accessed applicant’s social networking information 
in determining whether to admit them to their school). 
 222  See supra note 159 and accompanying text (suggesting that one admissions 
officer reported a specific instance where a student was rejected for bragging on his Facebook 
page that he had aced the application process but did not feel as though he would be attending 
that particular university).  
 223  See supra text accompanying note 160 (suggesting that some public colleges 
are making such software mandatory for student athletes). 
 224  See supra text accompanying note 160 (explaining the functionality of the 
monitoring software being used by some public colleges).  
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word search can scan for discussion referencing NCAA and potential 
violations under the NCAA rules.225  
 Technology is not necessarily a tool for today’s children, but 
inevitably a significant part of their daily lives.226  Children as young as 
thirteen have been known to post inappropriate content on their social 
networking pages.227 Social networking activity can remain for long periods 
of time making it difficult for adults to leave their past decisions behind. 228 
State legislatures have demonstrated that there is a need to protect a child or 
student’s private decisions from their future universities.229  
 
2. Tatro Allows for Broad Punishment of Expansive Rules Indirectly 
Related to Professional Standards 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Tatro suggests that 
public universities may punish for a broad range of student behavior if a 
rational connection can be made between the otherwise protected speech and 
a professional standard. 230  In Tatro, the court held that Tatro could 
constitutionally be punished for university rules that were “narrowly 
tailored” and “directly related” to the professional standards taught by the 
mortuary program.231 Despite the University’s insistence that the Mortuary 
Program sought to emphasize and teach professional standards as a vital part 
of its curriculum, the mortuary department did not offer any ethics courses to 
its mortuary students. 232  Furthermore, it is clear that what constituted 
“blogging” about the laboratory course was likely never explained to Tatro 
                                                 
 225  See supra text accompanying note 160 (explaining that the key-word search 
can scan for references to NCAA violations including, for example, the offering of bribes or 
solicitation by agents).  
 226  See supra note 95 and accompanying text (quoting a young girl who stated 
“Isn’t everything technology? . . . I don’t think about [it] . . . [i]t’s just everywhere”).  
 227  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that it was not unusual 
for girls as young as thirteen to post inappropriate pictures of themselves on MySpace). 
 228  See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that Facebook provides 
that users’ public information may become publically available after being posted). 
 229  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (suggesting that parents became 
alarmed concerning the potential repercussions of their children’s actions). 
 230  See supra text accompanying note 18 (holding that a post-secondary university 
may punish a student without infringing upon their First Amendment right to free speech if 
such punishment is the result a violation of a university rule that is narrowly tailored and 
directly related to professional conduct standards); see also supra note 81 and accompanying 
text (explaining that the Tatro standard gives great deference to a university in determining 
when a connection exists between a professional standard and student conduct that is 
offensive or inconsistent with such professional standards).  
 231  See supra text accompanying note 18 (using the language “narrowly tailored” 
and “directly related” to establish what the court considered the sufficient nexus to allow 
educational punishment of otherwise protected, off-campus speech).  
 232  See supra text accompanying notes 33–34 (explaining that while the 
University of Minnesota’s Mortuary Program requires classes such as science, business, grief 
and dying across cultures, embalming, and a clinical rotation to a funeral home, it did not offer 
a specific ethics course when Tatro was a student). 
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and her classmates. 233  Tatro was unaware not only that her expressive 
conduct violated the subjectively written laboratory course rule, but likely, 
that a connection could be made to a professional standard regarding dignity 
and respect of a body.234  
The professional rule the University claimed Tatro’s Facebook posts 
violated states in relevant part that no licensee or intern shall engage in 
unprofessional conduct, “including but not limited to . . . failure to treat with 
dignity and respect the body of the deceased . . . or any other person 
encountered while within the scope of practice, employment, or business.”235 
Allowing regulation of this professional standard by a university means that 
a student can be punished for failing to treat any person with dignity and 
respect under any university standard or rule.236 Furthermore, the statutory 
language “including but not limited to” suggests that the scope of the rule 
may extend beyond the explicit language of the statute and include 
unmentioned behavior.237  
The Tatro holding leaves unquestionably broad discretion for the 
regulation of professional standards through application of university rules, 
not only for mortuary students, but the numerous professional programs that 
are offered to Minnesota post-secondary students. 238  For example, the 
Minnesota statute regulating professional conduct for family counselors 
states that a counselor’s license may be revoked if the professional board 
determines he or she engaged in “dishonest conduct,” whether or not the 
conduct relates to their employment.239 Under Tatro, students studying to be 
licensed therapists can be punished for violating any university or course rule 
which relates to dishonest conduct even if that conduct does not relate to 
                                                 
 233  See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (stating that Tatro testified there 
was no discussion of what constituted blogging; Tatro’s classmate who testified on behalf of 
the University did not recall if the instructor had ever mentioned anything about Facebook, 
Twitter, or MySpace in reference to blogging, and the professor felt defining something 
students could look up in the dictionary unnecessary).   
 234  See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (explaining not only Tatro 
testified there was no discussion of what constituted blogging at orientation, but that when 
asked if she had specifically told students it was not acceptable to write on Facebook 
regarding the course, Tatro’s professor was unable to respond on the record).  
 235  See supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating that Minn. Stat. § 149A.70, 
subd. 7(3) (2007), which the Minnesota Supreme Court found the university rule against 
“blogging” to correlate to, regulates the professional conduct of funeral directors). 
 236  See supra note 79 and accompanying text (suggesting that the University is 
entitled to enforce professional norms through the creation and regulation of university and 
course rules). 
 237  See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that ethics are a fundamental 
part of an educational program and therefore can be regulated by public educators and staff).  
 238  See supra note 84 and accompanying text (stating that the University of 
Minnesota offers many programs at both the graduate, as well as undergraduate level, which 
concern professional standards). 
 239  See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing MINN. STAT. § 148B.59 
(2007) regulating the professional conduct of a counselor).  
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their status as a student or future employee.240 Where the Tatro court would 
draw the line, however, and disallow university suppression of student 
speech is unclear.241 
 
C. Without Clear Direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, Public 
Schooling at all Levels is Stuck between a Rock and a Hard Place in 
Applying Tatro-like Standards 
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to draw a definable line in 
Tatro and, as a result, Minnesota students and public schools remain 
vulnerable.242 Courts have struggled to balance First Amendment, on-
campus, student speech with the educational goals of public universities 
since Tinker.243 Attempting to implement on-campus precedent to off-
campus Internet speech has led to confusing and inconsistent decisions.244 
Guidance from the United States Supreme Court is essential to the resolution 
of future Tatro like cases.245 
 
1. The Vital Protection of Student Expression under the First Amendment  
Sanctioning students for violating broad curricular rules which may 
or may not correlate to expansive professional standards, poses the danger of 
overshadowing otherwise protected speech in the interest of maintaining 
potentially outdated professional norms.246 American students are notorious 
for challenging professional norms under the broad protection of the First 
Amendment. 247  Society depends on the encouragement of fresh, young 
                                                 
 240  See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that a University may 
enforce professional norms through application of campus rules).  
 241  See supra text accompanying note 78 (suggesting that the Tatro court did not 
specify how the breadth of professional standards affects a university’s ability to punish for 
student expression).  
 242  See supra note 89 and accompanying text (stating that a student who was just 
one semester away from graduating from nursing school was kicked out of a Minnesota public 
university’s program for calling someone a “stupid bitch” on his Facebook page).  
 243  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker where courts first limited a public school’s ability to 
regulate on-campus student speech). 
 244  See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that tremendous confusion 
exists in thousands of school districts regarding off-campus speech leading to wasted 
resources). 
 245 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (stating that while schools have 
been given power through student speech cases to regulate on campus, the Supreme Court has 
not addressed regulation of off-campus speech). 
 246  See supra note 2 and accompanying text (regarding a state-supported college’s 
denial of Petitioner’s application requesting recognition of a controversial political student 
organization).  
 247  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that student interests and 
concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty, result from values, views, and 
ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or 
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perspectives to continue forward movement on an innovative path toward 
global growth. 248  It is clear that Tatro’s Facebook posts were not only 
offensive, but unlikely to propel academia forward.249 However, the Tatro 
decision extends far beyond Tatro’s unpleasant posts.250 Under Tatro, any 
unpopular thought or political speech considered reasonably related to a 
professional standard may now, should a public university choose, be 
regulated and punished regardless of when, where, or how it occurs.251 The 
United States Supreme Court must exercise its power to determine what 
Internet student speech may be suppressed in the interest of an educational 
program and what must continue to be protected under the First Amendment 
in the interest of post-secondary student privacy, as well as academic 
growth.252 
 
2. Protecting Youth against Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats does not 
Require Suppression of the First Amendment 
Concern for cyberbullying and cyberthreats has left many concerned 
students, parents, and educators fearful that public schools lack the power to 
address attacks on K-12 children without suppressing the bully’s free speech 
rights.253 In an attempt to regulate cyberbullying, schools are left with the 
same inconsistent precedent to determine what role they can play in 
regulating off-campus Internet speech.254   
Students, who use the Internet to harass classmates, threaten 
violence, or to make false statements of criminal activity, should reasonably 
                                                                                                                   
indoctrinated, when such students ask for change, the students speak in the tradition of 
Jefferson and Madison and the First Amendment); see also supra note 12 and accompanying 
text (stating that often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate and must be 
protected). 
 248  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that when students ask for 
change, it is typically at odds with the ideologies of the university).  
 249  See supra text accompanying notes 44–48 (quoting Tatro’s Facebook posts 
deemed offensive and inappropriate under professional conduct standards by the University of 
Minnesota).  
 250 See supra text accompanying note 18 (holding that a public university may 
punish a student for any conduct that violates a narrowly tailored university rule that the 
university can show is related to a professional standard).  
 251  See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro stressed she made 
the posts off campus).  
 252  See supra note 3 and accompanying text (holding that scholarship cannot 
flourish in the absence of First Amendment protections). 
 253  See supra text accompanying note 138 (stating that educators are faced with 
challenging issues when off-campus cyberbullying that is potentially protected from school 
interference under the First Amendment has a clear effect on their students). 
 254  See supra text accompanying note 133 (arguing that school districts are faced 
with confusing standards regarding off-campus speech). 
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be punished for their actions.255 Internet harassment may have an extreme 
impact on victims.256 Students, parents, and educators may address issues of 
cyberbullying and cyberthreats under state law, as well as through informal 
methods without infringing upon a student’s First Amendment rights, such as 
school counseling or by contacting parents.257  
Conflicting lower court opinions suggest that a school must prepare 
for the possibility of lengthy and expensive litigation in response to any 
punishment of a student for Internet conduct.258 The Supreme Court must 
determine when student speech occurring off campus and on the Internet 
may be regulated by K-12 schools to protect both victims of cyberbullying as 
well as the constitutional rights of students.259  Until the Supreme Court 
accepts an Internet student speech case, violent threats may continue, in 
some instances, to go unpunished while activist students remain at risk for 
punishment as a result of their unpopular opinions.260 As is evidenced by the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, some educators are expected to maintain a 
total hands-off approach to the regulation of off-campus Internet speech 
absent a direct threat of violence.261 Regardless of which court has it right, 
wrong, or otherwise, it is clear that the holdings are, at best, unpredictable 
and resolution of the issue is fundamental to future student speech cases.262  
                                                 
 255  See supra text accompanying notes 153–155 (suggesting that intervention by 
school officials without student punishment may sometimes allow for effective action while 
avoiding liability for suppression of First Amendment rights).  
 256  See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the long-term, 
damaging effects that bullying can have on children immediately, as well as later as adults).  
 257  See supra text accompanying notes 150–155 (explaining that victims of 
cyberbullying, parents, and concerned teachers may rely on state bullying laws, criminal law, 
or tort law, as well as attempt to address the situation informally without suppressing student 
speech under the First Amendment to counteract cyberbullying).  
 258  See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that confusing standards have 
led to the concern that schools might trigger a lawsuit claiming violation of First Amendment 
rights for regulating off-campus student speech that occurs online). 
 259  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting that unpopular and often 
unpleasant thought must be protected under the First Amendment); see also supra text 
accompanying note 133 (suggesting that school officials cannot afford to wait any longer for a 
definitive answer as to when they may intervene to protect students who are being targeted by 
internet bullies).  
 260  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that erroneous and 
unpleasant statements must be protected under the First Amendment); see also supra note 89 
and accompanying text (discussing the expulsion of a student for posting the phrase “stupid 
bitch” on Facebook and stating that there was not enough whiskey in the world for anger 
management). 
 261  See supra note 91 and accompanying text (holding that because neither the 
Third Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court has ever allowed an educational institution 
to punish for off-campus speech, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not do so now).  
 262  See supra note 91 and accompanying text (comparing the holding of Tatro to 
Snyder and its application of the Tinker standard). 
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Technology plays an intricate and vital role in the way individuals 
communicate. 263  Internet accessibility and its capability of connecting 
individuals with literally anyone in the world presents problems far removed 
from the traditional on-campus student speech that the Supreme Court has 
analyzed.264 The Supreme Court must draw a clear line for lower courts to 
apply to student speech cases like Tatro. 265  Without such direction, 
inconsistencies will remain, innocent students will be sanctioned for 
exercising their constitutional rights, and violence may at times go 
unpunished by concerned educators.266 
 
D. Absent Clear Harm or Imminent Threat, the First Amendment Should 
Extend to all Social Network Speech 
The First Amendment should extend to all student speech on social 
networking websites except in cases of clear threat of harm or imminent 
danger.267 The Supreme Court has never punished student speech that occurs 
entirely off campus and is unrelated to a school sponsored activity.268 To 
allow public K-12 school districts and public post-secondary universities to 
regulate and punish for expressive student speech would create the 





                                                 
 263  See supra text accompanying note 5 (stating that social networking has 
revolutionized the way in which people communicate); see also supra note 1 and 
accompanying text (holding that the First Amendment permits a state to ban “true threats,” to 
protect individuals from the fear of violence and disruption). 
 264  See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that the logic behind 
Supreme Court student speech opinions crumbles when applied to off-campus student 
speech). 
 265 See supra text accompanying note 133 (explaining schools are stuck between a 
rock and a hard place without direction from the Supreme Court on the First Amendment 
rights of students off campus and online, and their public K-12 schools to punish students for 
it when necessary). 
 266  See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that K-12 public schools are 
responsible for protecting students and teachers from online harassment).  
 267  See supra note 1 and accompanying text (arguing that a Social Networking 
Constitution should be created to protect freedom of expression online under the First 
Amendment).  
 268  See supra note 90 and accompanying text (asserting that Supreme Court 
student speech cases are limited to on-campus activity or speech which occurred during a 
school-supervised event and that the Supreme Court has yet to address the contours of a 
student’s free speech rights when such speech originates off campus).   
 269  See supra note 2 and accompanying text (suggesting that any leeway for 
punishment of employees and students could lead to unconstitutional results).  
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1. Punishment for Off-Campus Speech Offends a Students’ First 
Amendment Rights 
 
Democracy is grounded in the ability of citizens to speak freely and 
critically.270 To say otherwise, offends the protections provided by the First 
Amendment.271 The Supreme Court has stated that the vigilant protection of 
First Amendment protection is nowhere more vital than in American 
schools. 272  Student interests are traditionally at odds with those of their 
educational institutions.273 Yet the Court has stated, time and time again, that 
unpopular or offensive student demonstration is, and must continue to be, 
constitutionally protected.274  
While K-12 students, who are required by law to attend class, 
occasionally need protection from substantial disruptions occurring on 
campus, students do not require the same protection for the conduct of their 
classmates that occurs off campus.275 In expressing potentially unpopular 
opinions, students contribute a fresh perspective within the academic 
community, call for change to outdated standards, and work to advance 
society.276 To ensure the growth of academia, teachers and students alike 






                                                 
 270  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that unpleasant statements 
must be protected in free debate).  
 271  See supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting that such unpleasantries 
must be tolerated if constitutional protections are expected to endure).  
 272  See supra note 3 and accompanying text (holding that teachers and students 
must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate). 
 273  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (suggesting that often student values 
are at war with those traditionally espoused or indoctrinated by the college). 
 274  See supra notes 2–4, 20, 73 (holding that a K-12 school system’s ability to 
regulate speech is highly limited); see also supra text accompanying note 121 (suggesting that 
at least four exceptions exist which allow regulation of student speech: (1) on-campus speech 
that substantially or materially disrupts school activities; (2) lewd or offensive speech 
occurring on campus; (3) speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs; or (4) speech that falls 
into one of the first three categories and occurs off campus, but during a school sponsored 
event).    
 275  See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (holding that educators must 
be able to act to protect the interests of their students who are required by law to attend 
classes). 
 276  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (arguing that when students ask for 
change, they speak directly to the spirit of Jefferson, Madison, and the First Amendment).  
 277  See supra note 3 and accompanying text (asserting that scholarship cannot 
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust). 
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2. Schools Can Still Protect Students against Cyberbullies if Social 
Networking Speech is Protected under the First Amendment 
Extending First Amendment protection to student speech occurring 
on the Internet would not, however, wholly prevent a public K-12 school 
district from addressing cyberbullying or cyberthreats. 278  Educators may 
informally involve parents, school counselors, teachers, and school staff to 
address potential cyberbullies. 279  Victims of online harassment and their 
parents may also seek remedies for questioned speech that falls under 
enacted state tort or criminal law.280 Most importantly, as with any speech 
that may otherwise fall under the First Amendment, threats of violence or 
imminent harm are not constitutionally protected and will always justify K-
12 or post-secondary intervention.281 These alternative remedies suggest that 
confining the First Amendment in student speech cases will not effectively 
resolve the on-going issues with cyberbullies and cyberthreats.282  
Tatro, however, never made true threats of violence or intent to 
cause imminent harm in her Facebook posts.283  Tatro explained that her 
December 6, 2009 post stating, “[g]ive me room, lots of aggression to be 
taken out with a trocar” referenced a previous incident where a classmate had 
to use both hands to insert a trocar.284 Tatro also explained that her December 
7, 2009 post which read “[w]ho knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I still 
want to stab a certain someone in the neck with a trocar though” was 
regarding an ex-boyfriend whom she had recently broken up with.285 Tatro 
assumed that her Facebook friends would know she was speaking 
                                                 
 278  See supra text accompanying notes 154–155 (noting that there are less formal 
ways to address cyberbullying and cyberspeech than to punish a student by expelling or 
suspending them). 
 279  See supra text accompanying notes 154–155 (suggesting that such informal 
intervention may take place when faculty and staff become concerned that the off-campus 
speech may be affecting a student on campus).  
 280  See supra text accompanying note 151 (stating that students experiencing 
harassment online may be protected by state law). 
 281  See supra note 1 and accompanying text (holding that the First Amendment 
permits a State to ban “true threats” regardless of actual intent to carry out the threat, to 
protect individuals from the fear of violence and disruption). 
 282  See supra text accompanying notes 151–155 (discussing the many alternatives 
that exist for victims of cyberbullying as well as those acting in the cyberbully or victim’s 
interest to prevent future harassment).   
 283  See supra text accompanying notes 45–48 (quoting Tatro’s Facebook posts 
November 12, 2009, December 6, 2009, December 7, 2009, and one undated that became the 
subject of her punishment and later litigation).  
 284  See supra note 46 and accompanying text (indicating that at that time, other 
students in Tatro’s laboratory class had joked about aggression).  
 285  See supra note 47 and accompanying text (suggesting that Tatro was upset due 
to her breakup as well as the fact that she had recently given permission for her mother to 
undergo surgery).  
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sarcastically and in reaction to the breakup.286 University police reviewed the 
posts and determined that Tatro’s posts did not amount to criminal threats.287 
Although the content of her posts was clearly distasteful, the status updates 
did not suggest that Tatro was planning or intending to commit any unlawful 
or violent act from which individuals must be protected.288 The Supreme 
Court has never upheld punishment of a student for expressive activity 
occurring off campus with the exception of school-sponsored events for K-
12 students. 289  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s extension of on-campus 
precedent to off-campus control of post-secondary students is unfounded in 
student-speech cases.290  
Post-secondary students, like Tatro, who use Facebook to express 
their private thoughts, should not be required to take a leave of absence from 
their First Amendment rights until they have graduated from their respective 
universities.291 The Constitution was written to stand the test of time and, 
absent a true threat, the First Amendment therefore extends to student speech 
on the Internet.292 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this country, we do not allow children to drive cars without 
supervision until they are at least sixteen years of age.293 Similarly, we do not 
consider an individual to be a legal adult until they are eighteen years old.294 
It is not until they reach the age of twenty-one, three years after they have 
reached legal adulthood that they are able to enter a bar and purchase an 
                                                 
 286  See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro assumed her 
Facebook friends would know that she was not seriously considering using the laboratory tool 
as a weapon).  
 287  See supra text accompanying note 55 (stating that University Police ultimately 
determined that Tatro had not acted criminally). 
 288  See supra text accompanying note 55 (explaining that University police 
determined Tatro had not acted criminally when she posted regarding the Mortuary Science 
Program on Facebook).  
 289  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding in Morse that a school 
district does not violate a student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating a banner 
promoting illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event when the presence of the banner 
suggests the school’s support of illegal activity).  
 290  See supra text accompanying note 121 (discussing the four categories of 
United States Supreme Court cases which have allowed a school to suppress student speech). 
 291  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (arguing that speech occurring online 
should be as, if not more, protected than First Amendment speech occurring offline).  
 292  See supra note 1 and accompanying text (arguing that a Social Networking 
Constitution should be created to protect freedom of expression online under the First 
Amendment).  
 293  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that allowing a child to 
use social networking websites may be just as dangerous as handing them the keys to a car).    
 294  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (arguing that while the U.S. 
Constitution generally protects freedom of expression, the issue becomes particularly tricky 
when dealing with underage students).   
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alcoholic beverage.295  Our society imposes these age restrictions, among 
other reasons, to protect the child or young adult from decisions they have 
not become mature enough to make.296 Children of all ages, however, use 
technology without supervision or similar legal protection.297  In fact, we 
encourage children to acquire computer skills knowing their significance in 
our modern world.298 Tatro suggests that a student waives his or her First 
Amendment right to free speech and subsequently opens him or herself up to 
punishment when his or her Internet post contravenes a legitimate 
educational rule related to a professional standard.299 If this is true, we must 
come to accept that, under cases like Tatro, a child may waive deeply rooted 





                                                 
 295  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that individuals are not legally 
allowed to drink until they have reached the age of 21). 
 296  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (arguing that we do this to protect 
children who are not ready to face the potential consequences of such dangerous activities). 
 297  See supra note 95 and accompanying text (quoting an underage student 
explaining that technology is everywhere and a part of her daily life).  
 298  See supra text accompanying note 8 (explaining that society encourages the 
use of technology by students of a young age due to its prevalence in society).  
 299  See supra note 86 and accompanying text (holding that Tatro could be 
punished for a Facebook post which could have been viewed by thousands on Facebook).  
 300  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that we encourage use of 
technology by young people yet, restrict their ability to drink, drive and engage in otherwise 
dangerous activities to protect them).  
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